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  INTRODUCTION   
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohib-
its labor market discrimination against individuals who have 
an “impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities,” who are “regarded as” having a substantial impair-
ment, or who have “a record of” a substantial impairment.1 A 
substantial impairment has always been the touchstone of 
what it means to be disabled for the purposes of federal dis-
crimination law. Never has federal law attempted to distin-
guish between different types of substantial impairments, or 
between degrees of substantial impairments, or between differ-
ent subgroups of substantially impaired individuals.2 An indi-
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 1. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012). For simplicity, I will refer only to the ADA, 
which prohibits discrimination by private-sector employers against qualified 
disabled workers, throughout this Article. Note, however, that the arguments 
presented here would apply to other laws that prohibit discrimination against 
disabled workers, including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as well as state-
level disability laws. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797(b) (2012) (covering public-sector 
workplaces). 
 2. In fact, Congress’s intention when passing the ADA was to find a 
common-ground definition of disability that would encompass all disabled in-
dividuals, despite the diversity of their disabling conditions. See NAT’L COUN-
CIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE 
  
1100 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1099 
 
vidual who qualifies for coverage may be on a cane or in a 
wheelchair, hard of hearing or completely deaf, African Ameri-
can or white, male or female. As long as the impairment meets 
the substantial threshold, it is enough to afford the individual 
coverage under the ADA, and coverage does not vary with se-
verity of the underlying condition.3 Nor does the ADA’s cover-
age vary if the substantially impaired individual is a member of 
another protected class. A substantially impaired white male is 
entitled to exactly the same remedies under the ADA as a sub-
stantially impaired African-American female.4 
Of course, disabled individuals who are members of other 
protected classes may have access to additional employment 
discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibits race, color, national origin, religion, 
and sex discrimination in employment.5 Yet such individuals 
only have access if they have proof of discrimination that spe-
cifically relates to their Title VII protected status. For example, 
a disabled female worker who feels she has been discriminated 
against by her employer due to her disadvantaged status does 
not necessarily have a successful claim under either Title VII or 
the ADA. The worker can bring a successful ADA claim only if 
she has proof specific to employer discrimination on the basis of 
disability; she can bring a successful Title VII claim only if she 
has proof specific to employer discrimination on the basis of 
sex.6 If she lacks sufficient evidence for one claim—or more 
worrisome, if her evidence of sex and disability discrimination 
 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 80 (2d ed. 2010), http://www.ncd.gov/ 
publications/2010/equality_of_Opportunity_The_Making_of_the_Americans_ 
with_Disabilities_Act (“The challenge, therefore, was to find a definition that 
was at once inclusive enough to cover diverse disabilities, but not so universal 
that anyone could claim protection by the ADA.”). 
 3. See id. at xviii (“The disability community’s abiding commitment to 
act as one unified voice helped keep the ADA a strong act and prevented the 
exclusion of specific subgroups of disabilities.”). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (noting Congress’s intent to provide a 
“consistent” remedy for all disabled individuals). 
 5. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting employers from “fail[ing] or 
refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise . . . discrimi-
nat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin”). 
 6. Cf. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So 
Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 563 (2001) (describing courts’ reluctance to 
draw an inference of discrimination from “ambiguous or contested evidence” 
and circumstantial evidence more generally). 
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is inextricably intertwined7—she may only have a remedy un-
der one of the two statutes, or she may completely lack a reme-
dy. 
Imagine the female worker is in a wheelchair and regularly 
referred to by her employer as a “crippled witch,”8 or imagine 
instead that the female worker has dyslexia and is regularly re-
ferred to by her employer as “a dumb slut.”9 In both cases, the 
employer’s name-calling seems inappropriate for the workplace 
and indicative of animus based on the worker’s disadvantaged 
status. But it is not clear from the name-calling whether the 
employer’s animus is derived from the worker’s status as a 
woman, her status as a disabled person, or both. But if the fe-
male worker wants a remedy under Title VII and the ADA, she 
will have to prove both—and it is not clear that she can from 
these statements alone. 
The dilemma faced by the disabled, female worker de-
scribed above is an intersectionality problem. Intersectionality 
problems may arise whenever an individual possesses multiple 
traditionally disadvantaged identities or minority statuses.10 
Intersectionality implies that employment discrimination is 
compounded or exacerbated in the presence of multiple protect-
ed statuses; in other words, the whole discrimination experi-
enced by a multiple-protected-status individual is more than 
the sum of its parts.11 To the extent that intersectionality ex-
 
 7. Cf. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (demonstrating one federal court’s struggle to differ-
entiate between age discrimination and sex discrimination when the plaintiff ’s 
primary evidence was that she had been called “useless old lady” by her su-
pervisors). 
 8. This example is one used by the United Nations in its disability equal-
ity training manual on defeating harmful stereotypes of disabled individuals. 
See LIZ CARR ET AL., DISABILITY EQUALITY TRAINING: ACTION FOR CHANGE 73 
(2012), http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/egms/2015/Kenji_Kuno_ 
Change.pdf (citing the image of a “crippled witch” as one of the ways in which 
the “word disabled becomes synonymous for impotence, hopelessness and so-
cial inadequacy”). 
 9. This example is one used as an illustrative example of discrimination 
by the Labor Law Center on its Human Resources Blog. See Insults in the 
Workplace, LABOR LAW CTR.: HUMAN RES. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2011, 11:21 AM), 
http://www.humanresourceblog.com/2011/10/29/insults-in-the-workplace. 
 10. See generally Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology 
of Science Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMI-
NIST THEORY 67 (2008) (discussing the meaning of the term “intersection-
ality”). 
 11. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersection-
ality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
  
1102 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1099 
 
ists, it is inherently problematic under current judicial inter-
pretations of federal discrimination laws, in which judges ana-
lyze each type of discrimination separately (e.g., a discrimina-
tion claim on the basis of disability is analyzed separately from 
a discrimination claim on the basis of sex) instead of consider-
ing the potential multiplicative effects when more than one 
type of discrimination is present (e.g., analyzing disability and 
sex discrimination together).12 Intersectionality problems may 
arise for more than just disabled women; they may arise for 
any individual who is a member of multiple protected classes, 
including African-American women13 and older women.14 
The focus of this Article, however, will be on the intersec-
tional discrimination encountered by disabled women, who 
have been completely ignored by prior intersectional scholar-
ship. This inattention by previous literature does not derive 
from the insignificance or rarity of intersectional sex-disability 
discrimination; rather, it appears to be a complete oversight by 
prior scholars in both law and economics. Even economists who 
have studied the employment and wage effects of the ADA have 
paid little attention to the fact that the Act appears to have im-
proved conditions for disabled men more than disabled wom-
en.15 This Article ends the scholarly disregard for the gendered 
nature of disability discrimination by using data to demon-
strate both the magnitude and the essence of the problem. Re-
lying on confidential data from the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC), this Article is the first to expose 
the sex-based gap in disability discrimination charges filed 
with the agency.16 On average, women file an absolutely greater 
 
1241 (1991) (discussing intersectional discrimination, particularly as it applies 
to African-American women). 
 12. See infra notes 29–45 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 32–45 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employ-
ment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. 
ECON. 915, 949–50 (2001) (finding that disabled women’s employment de-
clined more than disabled men’s employment after the ADA). 
 16. In order to sue an employer for disability (or sex) discrimination in 
federal court, a worker is first required to exhaust administrative remedies—
that is, to file a charge with the EEOC, to allow the agency at least 180 days to 
investigate the charge, and to request a notice-of-right-to-sue letter from the 
agency. For an overview of the charge-filing process, see After You Have Filed 
a Charge, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (2016), http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
employees/afterfiling.cfm. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is 
grounds for dismissal of an employment discrimination lawsuit brought under 
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number of ADA charges with the EEOC than do men, and they 
file almost 50% more charges per full-time worker than do 
men.17 The Article further uses data to consider possible expla-
nations for the gender gap in ADA charge-filing rates, including 
the possibility that women are more likely to become disabled 
than are men, and the possibility that women are more likely to 
raise the issue of their disability with employers.18 
Ultimately, however, this Article will trace the greater 
number of ADA charges filed by women to the interaction be-
tween disability discrimination and sex discrimination. The Ar-
ticle will demonstrate empirically that ADA charge-filing rates 
are highest in industries dominated by workers of one sex.19 
Men are more likely to file ADA charges in female-dominated 
industries, and women are more likely to file ADA charges in 
male-dominated industries. Because many more industries are 
male dominated than are female dominated,20 the result is a 
greater overall ADA charge-filing rate by women than by men. 
Moreover, a comparison of men’s and women’s charge-filing 
rates under the ADA to their charge-filing rates under other 
discrimination statutes demonstrates that the charge-filing 
pattern among members of the minority sex within an industry 
is unique to the ADA. Sex discrimination, it appears, has a 
uniquely exacerbating effect on disability discrimination.21 
The empirical analysis presented here sheds light on prior 
(but unexplained) results by labor economists, showing that 
disabled men have fared better in the labor market during the 
post-ADA regime22 than have disabled women. Disabled men 
are more likely to experience only one type of employment dis-
crimination (disability), but disabled women are more likely to 
experience two types of employment discrimination (disability 
 
either the ADA or Title VII, although the exhaustion requirement is not juris-
dictional. See Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 726 F.3d 851, 856 (6th Cir. 
2013); Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2010); Douglas v. Do-
novan, 559 F.3d 549, 556 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See infra Parts II.C, II.D. 
 19. See infra Part II.E. 
 20. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. Throughout this Article 
and supporting data analysis, I focus on the nature of disability discrimination 
claims prior to the 2008 ADA Amendments Act. The data available for the 
present study solely allow me to make inferences about the pre-ADA Amend-
ments Act period; as additional data become available, developments after the 
2008 ADA Amendments Act present a ripe area for future study. 
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and sex).23 As long as courts continue to analyze sex discrimina-
tion and disability discrimination separately, the ADA is capa-
ble of providing a complete remedy to disabled men, but neither 
the ADA nor Title VII are capable of providing a complete rem-
edy to disabled women.24 The real puzzle, then, is finding a le-
gal and feasible way for disabled women to gain a complete 
remedy for any discrimination they encounter in the labor 
market. 
Some intersectional scholars have suggested amending 
employment discrimination statutes to provide for intersection-
al claims explicitly, but this Article argues that such amend-
ments are neither necessary nor practical.25 The better solution 
for sex-disability intersectional discrimination plaintiffs is to 
work within the framework of existing statutes when bringing 
a compound discrimination claim.26 Nonetheless, such plaintiffs 
who seek to prove their cases circumstantially instead of direct-
ly—that is, plaintiffs who lack smoking-gun statements from 
the employer like the “crippled witch” and “dumb slut” exam-
ples mentioned above—may face an uphill battle in terms of 
proof.27 Judicially developed proof requirements in employment 
discrimination cases may prove particularly difficult to satisfy, 
given the unique circumstances faced by disabled women. In 
fact, disabled women provide a paramount example as to why 
such judicially developed proof requirements, which have al-
ready been the subject of much criticism, are so desperately in 
need of reform.28 
In making the case for increased attention to and expanded 
legal remedies for disabled women who experience labor mar-
ket discrimination, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I re-
views previous work on intersectional discrimination, which, 
 
 23. See infra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. See infra Part IV.A. 
 26. See infra Part IV.B. 
 27. See, e.g., Beauchat v. Mineta, 257 F. App’x 463, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (de-
fining direct evidence of discrimination as including “smoking gun” state-
ments); Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 397 (7th Cir. 
1997), overruled by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., No. 15-2574, 2016 WL 
4411434 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016) (“‘[S]moking gun’ evidence [is] required for a 
direct inference of discriminatory intent.”); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 
413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Absent the evidentiary equivalent of a ‘smoking gun,’ 
the plaintiff must attempt to prove her case by resort to a burden-shifting 
framework.”). 
 28. See infra Part IV.B. 
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heretofore, has focused almost exclusively on the experience of 
African-American women. Part II examines the EEOC data, 
which details the universe of ADA charges filed with the agen-
cy from 2000 to 2009. The EEOC data make clear how men’s 
and women’s disability charges differ, and the data also provide 
a great deal of evidence as to why men’s and women’s disability 
charges differ. Part III considers alternative hypotheses for the 
empirical findings in Part II, but ultimately concludes that 
women file more ADA charges than do men, because disabled 
women encounter more labor market discrimination than do 
men. Part IV evaluates the remedies available to disabled 
women. 
I.  THINKING ABOUT INTERSECTIONALITY   
The problem of intersectionality is hardly a new topic for 
employment discrimination scholars. Relatively early in the 
history of Title VII, legal scholars identified this potential 
weakness in the prevailing discrimination law framework. One 
of the first articles to discuss the need for, and potential diffi-
culties with, intersectional claims came from Elaine Shoben in 
1981. Shoben referred to discrimination on the basis of two or 
more protected classes as “compound discrimination.”29 Her 
conception of intersectional discrimination recognized that 
members of two or more protected groups might be “dispropor-
tionately exclude[d]” from employment, even when members of 
only one protected group experienced favorable employment 
outcomes.30 In other words, multidimensional discrimination 
might either co-exist with single-dimensional discrimination, or 
it might exist despite the absence of single-dimensional dis-
crimination. Focusing particularly on the example of African-
American women, Shoben acknowledged the difficulties of con-
ceptualizing a compound claim under Title VII’s proof frame-
work, yet she argued that compound claims were nonetheless 
permissible under the Act.31 
Nearly a decade later, Kimberle Crenshaw built upon 
Shoben’s work in her seminal article on intersectionality, high-
 
 29. Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race 
and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 793 (1981). 
 30. Id. at 798. 
 31. See id. (“This Article argues that overt discriminatory practices 
against compound groups have already been recognized as covered by the Act 
and that absent a showing of business necessity, Title VII also prohibits unin-
tentionally discriminatory practices adversely affecting compound groups.”). 
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lighting the difficulty of attempting to fit the “multidimension-
ality” of African-American women’s experience into the single-
dimensional framework of U.S. discrimination law.32 Unlike 
Shoben, Crenshaw was far less optimistic about Title VII’s abil-
ity to remedy intersectional discrimination, at least under con-
temporary conceptions of the meaning of discrimination. This 
conception, according to Crenshaw, merely viewed “oppression 
of Blacks [as] significant when based on race, of women when 
based on gender.”33 Using three Title VII cases with race-sex in-
tersectional elements as examples, Crenshaw illustrated how 
this single-dimensional framework had coerced African-
American women to “deny both the unique compoundedness of 
their situation and the centrality of their experiences to the 
larger classes of women and Blacks.”34 As long as discrimina-
tion policies continued to treat different categories of discrimi-
nation as “singular issues,” Crenshaw argued that victims of 
multidimensional issues would remain marginalized.35 
Crenshaw’s article arguably generated a new field within 
discrimination law scholarship, motivating dozens of subse-
quent works—both supportive and critical36—on intersectional-
ity.37 Yet even the supportive scholarship has largely shared 
 
 32. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theo-
ry and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139. 
 33. Id. at 166. 
 34. Id. at 150. 
 35. Id. at 167. 
 36. One of the most famous critiques of intersectionality came three years 
before Crenshaw’s article from Judge Thomas F. Hogan in Judge v. Marsh, 
649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). Here, Judge Hogan noted, “The difficulty 
with [allowing intersectional claims] is that it turns employment discrimina-
tion into a many-headed Hydra, impossible to contain within Title VII’s prohi-
bition. Following the [intersectionality] rationale to its extreme, protected 
subgroups would exist for every possible combination of race, color, sex, na-
tional origin and religion.” Id. 
 37. Accord Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical 
Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 
991–92 (2011) (“[Crenshaw’s] work has inspired two decades of research on 
intersectionality in many fields, including critical race theory, stratification, 
social psychology, and women’s studies.”); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality 
and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 713 (2015) (“Title VII 
was twenty-five years old when Kimberle Crenshaw published her path-
breaking article introducing ‘intersectionality’ to critical legal scholarship. By 
the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached its thirtieth birthday, the 
intersectionality critique had come of age, generating a sophisticated subfield 
and producing many articles that remain classics in the field of anti-
discrimination law and beyond.”). 
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Crenshaw’s underlying pessimism regarding courts’ abilities (or 
willingness) to accommodate intersectional claims under cur-
rent discrimination law frameworks. For example, Kathryn 
Abrams’s 1994 work on intersectionality highlighted the in-
creased appearance of multidimensional claims in Title VII ju-
risprudence, but recognized courts’ hitherto inabilities to con-
struct a pathway for incorporating intersectional claims into 
Title VII proof structures and analysis. According to Abrams, 
Many courts have been unwilling to accommodate these understand-
ings within Title VII doctrine, requiring that claimants disaggregate 
and choose among the elements of their identities; others have 
awarded relief to complex claimants but failed to give an account of 
the discrimination they face that would help integrate such claims in-
to the mainstream of Title VII doctrine.38 
Later work on intersectionality has been equally dismal. 
Over a decade after Abrams’s article, Bradley Areheart again 
illustrated the need for intersectional claims in employment 
discrimination law. Similar to previous scholars, Areheart fo-
cused on the case of African-American women, primarily since 
they had served as plaintiffs most often in prior intersectional 
claim attempts.39 Yet by 2006, Areheart believed that courts 
would not recognize intersectional claims on their own, arguing 
that “an amendment to Title VII that would cohere with its 
original legislative intent” was needed to remedy the problem 
of intersectional discrimination.40 Areheart characterized feder-
al courts as in a state of “confusion” over intersectional claims 
and, like Abrams, pointed to courts’ inability to see intersec-
tional claims as anything but “additive,” as opposed to multipli-
cative or compounding.41 
Although Crenshaw’s, Abrams’s, and Areheart’s character-
ization of the intersectional case law was qualitative, based on 
a close reading of select published cases, subsequent quantita-
tive research has validated their intuitions regarding the tra-
jectory of these claims. Using a sample of federal discrimina-
tion cases from 1965 to 1999, a 2011 study by a group of 
empirical legal scholars found that single-basis discrimination 
 
 38. Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 2479, 2481 (1994). 
 39. See Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting 
a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 199, 202 (2006) (“[T]his Ar-
ticle primarily examines the situation of black women, largely because they 
introduced and popularized intersectionality.”). 
 40. Id. at 201–02. 
 41. Id. at 228, 234. 
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plaintiffs were two times more likely to prevail in federal court 
than intersectional discrimination plaintiffs.42 With this finding 
in mind, the authors considered three different theories as to 
why intersectional plaintiffs might fare so poorly in federal 
court: “(1) the categorical nature of discrimination law creates 
doctrinal barriers to intersectional claims, (2) there are eviden-
tiary hurdles to demonstrating intersectional discrimination, 
and (3) judicial skepticism about intersectional claims may 
make intersectional plaintiffs less likely to win their cases.”43 
Based on their empirical analysis, the authors confirmed Cren-
shaw’s, Abrams’s, and Areheart’s intuition that “judges tend to 
believe that intersectional claims can be neatly separated,” 
which in turn harmed the plaintiffs whose claims could not be 
neatly separated.44 
Considered together, the legal literature advocating for 
greater recognition of intersectional discrimination claims has 
common threads. Scholars in this area seem to agree that until 
more courts begin to recognize the potential for discrimination 
to have multiple dimensions, not just a single dimension, cer-
tain minority subgroups will continue to be de facto (although, 
perhaps, unintentionally) excluded from the protections of dis-
crimination law. Notably, the certain minority subgroup that 
has heretofore received the most attention from intersection-
ality scholars is African-American women. As Areheart pointed 
out, much of this scholarly attention undoubtedly arises from 
the relative abundance of intersectional claims made by Afri-
can-American women, compared to other minority subgroups, 
in published cases.45 Still, intersectional discrimination has the 
potential to affect any individual who is a member of multiple 
protected classes, not just African-American women. To the ex-
tent that some of these other multiple-minority groups have 
been ignored by legal academics, the realities of the discrimina-
tion they encounter, or do not encounter, in the labor market 
merit further exploration. 
One notable exception to the otherwise primary focus on 
African-American women in the intersectional discrimination 
literature has arisen within recent legal scholarship on mass 
incarceration. Well-known, and troubling, are the stark differ-
ences between the incarceration rates of African-American men 
 
 42. See Best et al., supra note 37. 
 43. Id. at 1018. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Areheart, supra note 39. 
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and those of white men: African-American men are six times 
more likely than white men to spend time in prison,46 leading 
some scholars to proclaim this phenomenon as the “New Jim 
Crow.”47 Deborah Widiss has argued that mass incarceration 
may have an intersectional, and illegal, disparate impact48 on 
African-American males in employment.49 Because many em-
ployers now use criminal background checks during the hiring 
process, Widiss demonstrated through the use of a hypothet-
ical—and the actual disparities in race-sex incarceration 
rates—how such practices might result in multidimensional 
disparate impact, but not single-dimensional disparate impact: 
If [an employer’s criminal background check] policy is evaluated 
simply on the basis of race, the passage rates of men and women must 
be assessed together: 86% of the black applicants can be considered 
for the job, and 98% of the white applicants can be considered for the 
job. This is a real disparity, to be sure, but it falls well short of the 
EEOC’s rule of thumb for establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
impact. The same disparity results if the policy is considered on the 
basis of sex alone. But if one considers the passage rates in an inter-
sectional manner—assessing the policy’s effects on black men specifi-
cally—the resulting disparities are much greater. Only 76% of the 
black men could be considered, a rate that is far lower than that of 
any of the other potential groups of comparison (96% of the white 
men; 96% of the black women; and 100% of the white women).50 
Besides the extension of intersectional discrimination 
analysis beyond African-American women to African-American 
men, perhaps the more important contribution of Widiss’s ar-
gument is highlighting a need for intersectional disparate im-
 
 46. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRIS-
ONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 5, 8 (2003) (indicating that in 
2001, 5.9% of white men and 32.2% of African-American men were expected to 
spend time in prison at some point during their lives). 
 47. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012). But see James Forman, Jr., Ra-
cial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 21 (2012) (criticizing this characterization). 
 48. In order for an employer practice to have an illegal disparate impact 
under Title VII, the practice must not only disparately (and negatively) affect 
a protected class, but also the practice must lack job-relation or business ne-
cessity. Unlike a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff need not prove intent 
to discriminate to succeed on a disparate impact claim. See Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–32 (1971). 
 49. Deborah A. Widiss, Griggs at Midlife, 113 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1009–16 
(2015). 
 50. Id. at 1015–16. 
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pact claims, as opposed to the intersectional disparate treat-
ment claims focused on by most prior scholars.51 
Even though considerations of intersectionality in the con-
text of mass incarceration reflect a broadening beyond consid-
erations particular to disparate treatment particular to Afri-
can-American women, the argument nonetheless confines 
intersectionality claims to individuals who experience overlap-
ping race and sex discrimination. Yet if discrimination on the 
basis of race and sex is multiplicative, instead of additive, then 
so might be discrimination on the basis of other characteristics 
traditionally considered immutable under the law—whether 
such characteristics are protected by Title VII or by a different 
discrimination statute.52 Indeed, empirical economics scholar-
ship has hinted that intersectional discrimination may span 
multiple discrimination statutes, raising inter-statutory con-
cerns, not just intra-statutory ones. Empirical work by Joanne 
Song McLaughlin, for instance, found that the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act had more beneficial employment ef-
fects for older men than for older women.53 From her results, 
the author concluded that the traditional model of considering 
age discrimination and sex discrimination separately might not 
sufficiently protect older women in the labor market. Another 
recent resume-audit study drew similar conclusions,54 suggest-
ing that age discrimination laws seemed to protect older men 
adequately, but not older women, in hiring situations.55 
 
 51. Id. at 1007 (“While later cases have occasionally recognized the possi-
bility of bringing intersectional disparate treatment claims, intersectional dis-
parate impact doctrine has been very little developed.”). 
 52. For a critique of the immutability considerations present throughout 
employment discrimination law, see Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 
125 YALE L.J. 2 (2015). 
 53. See Joanne Song McLaughlin, Falling Between the Cracks: Discrimi-
nation Laws and Older Women (Oct. 2015) (University at Buffalo, Working 
Paper), https://hq.ssrn.com/Conference/Reports/Conf_PreliminaryProgReport 
.cfm?conflink=CELS-2015 (scroll down to “10/30/2015 – 10:15 AM, Location: 
Room 309, Labor and Employment I”; then follow “Article” hyperlink under 
article title and author name). 
 54. A typical resume audit study sends out fictitious resumes as applica-
tions to posted job openings. For a well-known example of a correspondence 
study, see Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg 
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor 
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (describing how sending 
out fictitious resumes that are identical, except for having names highly asso-
ciated with either white or African-American individuals, results in differen-
tial treatment of applicants, seemingly based on race). 
 55. See David Neumark, Ian Burn & Patrick Button, Is It Harder for Old-
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Although economists have of late been interested in the in-
tersection between age and sex discrimination, absent from the 
economics scholarship (and the legal scholarship) is any explo-
ration of the intersection between disability and sex discrimi-
nation. Nonetheless, a close reading of empirical literature on 
the labor market effects of disability discrimination laws should 
give scholars a reason to suspect a compounding, or multidi-
mensional, effect. A series of empirical studies on the wage and 
employment effects of disability laws, both state and federal, all 
indicate that these laws have resulted in unintended conse-
quences—causing, at worst, a decline in or, at best, no im-
provement in labor market outcomes of the disabled.56 The au-
 
er Workers To Find Jobs? New and Improved Evidence from a Field Experi-
ment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21669, 2015), http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w21669. The above study found evidence suggestive of 
intersectional age and sex discrimination. Id. at 59. However, a separate study 
(with the same lead author) did not find evidence suggestive of intersectional 
age and disability discrimination. See David Neumark, Joanne Song & Patrick 
Button, Does Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Make It Harder To 
Get Hired? Evidence from Disability Discrimination Laws (Nat’l Bureau Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 21379, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w21379 (“This evidence suggests that stronger state disability discrimination 
laws do not lower the hiring of non-disabled older workers, using either of two 
definitions of disability.”). 
 56. For instance, the earliest economics scholarship studying the effects of 
Title I of the ADA, which prohibits disability discrimination in employment, 
found a decline in labor market outcomes of the disabled as a result of the law. 
See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 948–50 (suggesting that the 
ADA “likely” caused a decrease in the rate of employment of people with disa-
bilities aged twenty-one to thirty-nine); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Em-
ployment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 
693, 711 (2000) (suggesting that passage of the ADA caused a decrease in the 
relative employment of disabled workers). Later studies, which revisit the ear-
ly results, have argued that the negative estimates may be due to difficulties 
in identifying disabled individuals within commonly used datasets and declin-
ing labor market participation by the disabled after the ADA. See, e.g., John 
Bound & Timothy Waidmann, Accounting for Recent Declines in Employment 
Rates Among Working-Aged Men and Women with Disabilities, J. HUM. RE-
SOURCES 231, 245 (2002) (analyzing data from the 1990s regarding the move-
ment of male and female workers with poor health out of the workforce and 
onto disability); Julie L. Hotchkiss, A Closer Look at the Employment Impact of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 887, 907–09 
(2004) (discussing the employment outcomes of people with disabilities); Doug-
las Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities Following the 
ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31, 31–33 (2003) (urging caution with regard to findings 
on the employment effects of the ADA considering the issues in identifying 
who the ADA actually covers). Even so, these later studies, at best, find no im-
provement in labor market outcomes of the disabled after the ADA. See, e.g., 
Bound & Waidmann, supra, at 244–45 (“Once the rise in the fraction of indi-
viduals receiving DI benefits has been accounted for, however, there is little 
  
1112 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1099 
 
thors have explained their results by suggesting the costs that 
disability laws impose on employers more than offset any in-
centives the laws create to employ disabled workers.57 
Although the wage and employment consequences of disa-
bility laws have been well considered by economists, few au-
thors have questioned a subtler aspect of their results: differen-
tial findings for women and men. For example, according to the 
baseline results of one leading study, disabled women ages 
twenty-one to thirty-nine worked between 2.37 and 4.57 fewer 
weeks in the years following the implementation of the ADA; in 
contrast, disabled men ages twenty-one to thirty-nine worked 
between 0 and 3.11 fewer weeks.58 In another well-known study 
examining the labor market effects of state disability laws, the 
authors concluded that disabled women’s earnings declined by 
4.9% after passage, but disabled men’s earnings declined by on-
ly 1.5%.59 In spite of finding consistently worse labor market 
outcomes for disabled women than for disabled men, economics 
scholars—and legal scholars reading the economics scholar-
ship—have ignored the sex differential, with one exception. The 
lone economists to make note of the sex differential, Daron 
Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist, suggested that the marginal 
benefits of the ADA might have been less for women since 
women were already protected against sex discrimination by 
Title VII.60 But this explanation conflates sex discrimination 
with disability discrimination without any clear reason for do-
ing so; it also fails to recognize that Title VII protects both men 
and women against sex discrimination. 
A more satisfying explanation for these differential results 
may instead lie in the theory of intersectionality. Perhaps disa-
bled women are less aided by disability discrimination laws be-
cause, for them, workplace discrimination is multidimensional, 
 
evidence of any effect of the ADA.”); Hotchkiss, supra, at 909 (“It is found that 
the unconditional employment probability among disabled people, relative to 
among nondisabled people, did not change significantly after implementation 
of the ADA.”); Kruse & Schur, supra, at 62 (“These results do not permit a 
clear overall answer to the question of whether the ADA has helped or hurt 
the employment of people with disabilities, since both positive and negative 
signs can be found.”). For a study finding a decline in labor market outcomes 
after the passage of state disability laws, see Kathleen Beegle & Wendy A. 
Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disability Discrimination Laws, 38 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 806 (2003). 
 57. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 915–57. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Beegle & Stock, supra note 56, at 806–59. 
 60. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15. 
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on the basis of disability and sex compounded. For disabled 
men, in contrast, discrimination is simply single-dimensional. 
When sex discrimination and disability discrimination inter-
sect, discrimination laws—as currently enforced by courts—
would be less capable of protection for precisely the same, well-
explored reasons that discrimination laws are less capable of 
protection when race discrimination and sex discrimination in-
tersect. Courts, as noted by prior intersectional scholars, are 
predisposed to disaggregation of discrimination claims, requir-
ing independent proof of each type of discrimination alleged.61 
In the context of sex and disability, such requirements might be 
particularly problematic for plaintiffs if an employer treats dis-
abled females poorly, but not disabled males or non-disabled 
females. Moreover, such requirements would be problematic 
whenever disability discrimination exacerbates already exist-
ent sex discrimination (or vice versa). These issues will be ex-
plored empirically in the next Part. 
II.  DISABILITY AND SEX BY THE NUMBERS   
This Part represents the principal contribution of this Arti-
cle, investigating the nature of the relationship, if any, between 
sex discrimination and disability discrimination. Section A con-
siders potential data sources for conducting such a study em-
pirically, and Section B details the summary statistics of the 
data used in this Article. Sections C, D, and E consider possible 
explanations for the relationship between disability discrimina-
tion and sex documented in Section B, ultimately arguing that 
intersectionality is the driving force behind the empirical re-
sults. 
A. WHY STUDY EEOC CHARGE DATA? 
To examine the intersectionality of sex and disability dis-
crimination empirically requires a data source, yet such a data 
source is not readily apparent. Most prior intersectionality 
studies, as discussed in the previous Section, have been quali-
tative or anecdotal in nature, highlighting a handful of federal 
cases that the authors have argued are representative of a 
 
 61. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 38 (“Many courts have been unwilling to 
accommodate these understandings within Title VII doctrine, requiring that 
claimants disaggregate and choose among the elements of their identities; 
others have awarded relief to complex claimants but failed to give an account 
of the discrimination they face that would help integrate such claims into the 
mainstream of Title VII doctrine.”). 
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larger sample.62 The one existing empirical study on 
intersectionality also relies on a sample of federal cases, sug-
gesting that federal case records may be the appropriate, if not 
the only available, data source for empirical work on sex-
disability intersectionality.63 Nonetheless, two problems render 
federal court records not ideal for the present study. 
First, the sample of reported federal sex-disability cases is 
small, and it is difficult to discern a clear takeaway from them. 
In Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., for example, the Tenth 
Circuit considered a Title VII-ADA wrongful termination case 
brought by a female employee with multiple sclerosis.64 The 
plaintiff brought forth evidence that her supervisor had sub-
jected her to different dress code restrictions than her male 
coworkers, referred to her as “girlie,” had a history of using ra-
cially and sexually derogatory language towards employees, 
and fired her immediately after the plaintiff presented a doc-
tor’s note prescribing lifting restrictions.65 With this evidence, 
the court allowed the plaintiff ’s ADA claim, but not her Title 
VII claim, to go forward.66 
Contrast Joseph v. HDMJ Restaurant, Inc., a case from the 
Eastern District of New York, in which a female plaintiff with a 
knee injury sued for wrongful termination and hostile work en-
vironment. The plaintiff ’s supervisors had repeatedly demand-
ed oral sex from her, called her racially and sexually derogatory 
names, and had physically dragged her down the stairs to ver-
bally abuse her, which exacerbated the injury in her knee.67 
Even under these outrageous facts, the court allowed the plain-
tiff ’s Title VII claim, but not her ADA claim, to go forward.68 In 
the background of these two cases, in which female plaintiffs 
with disabilities have been partially successful, is a list of cases 
 
 62. See, e.g., id.; Areheart, supra, note 39; Crenshaw, supra note 32. 
 63. Best et al., supra note 37. 
 64. 87 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 65. See id. at 1172. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Joseph v. HDMJ Rest., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139–41 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 68. Id. Indeed, it is difficult to find a gender-disability discrimination case 
in which a female disabled plaintiff has been wholly successful. Accord Herx v. 
Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 1086–87 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(dismissing employer’s appeal after district court granted its motion for sum-
mary judgment on employee’s ADA claim, but not her Title VII claim); Querry 
v. Messar, 14 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (allowing a female police 
officer to go forward on sex discrimination, but not disability discrimination, 
claims). 
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in which female plaintiffs with disabilities have been wholly 
unsuccessful.69 Thus, a review of the sex-disability discrimina-
tion case law, at best, appears to confirm the conclusions of the 
prior empirical study on intersectionality more generally, which 
found that single-basis discrimination plaintiffs are twice as 
likely to prevail in federal court than multiple-basis discrimi-
nation plaintiffs.70 
Second, and relatedly, studying discrimination through the 
lens of reported federal cases raises serious concerns about 
sample selection bias.71 Here, the concern is that a non-
representative sample of sex-disability cases gets to federal 
court (let alone results in a reported decision); thus, any infer-
ences drawn from reported federal cases would not be valid for 
the universe of sex-disability discrimination occurrences in the 
workplace. For instance, 234,925 Title VII charges and 67,147 
ADA charges were filed with the EEOC between 1998 and 
2001,72 but during that same period, only 47,249 Title VII cases 
 
 69. See, e.g., Johnson v. Weld Cty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming grant of summary judgment to employer on Title VII and ADA 
claims brought by a former female employee with multiple sclerosis); Coffman 
v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming grant 
of summary judgment to employer on female firefighter’s Title VII and ADA 
claims); Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(granting judgment as a matter of law to employer on Title VII and ADA 
claims after female disabled employee had won a jury verdict); Dechberry v. 
N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, 124 F. Supp. 3d 131, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing ADA 
and Title VII hostile work environment and adverse employment action claims 
brought by female emergency medical technician); Henderson v. Enter. Leas-
ing of Detroit, LLC, No. 13-14892, 2014 WL 1515828, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
18, 2014) (dismissing ADA and Title VII hostile work environment claims 
brought by female rental car agent); Aratari v. Genesee Cty. Sheriff ’s Office, 
No. 00-CV-0163E(M), 2000 WL 1047701, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000) (dis-
missing ADA and Title VII wrongful termination claims brought by female 
deputy sheriff ). 
 70. Best et al., supra note 37. 
 71. Sample selection bias occurs whenever a sample is drawn non-
randomly from the population intended to be studied. For a discussion of the 
biases that result from sample selection bias, and an econometric correction 
for such bias, see James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification 
Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979). 
 72. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 CHARGES FY 1997 – FY 2015 (2016), http://www.eeoc 
.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (adding together yearly data from 
the row labeled “Receipts”); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA) CHARGES FY 1997 – FY 
2015 (2016), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm 
(adding together yearly data from the row labeled “RECEIPTS”). 
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and 7001 ADA cases were filed in federal court.73 As these sta-
tistics illuminate, very few discrimination charges result in a 
federal lawsuit, which raises concerns regarding representa-
tiveness of the charges that do result in a federal lawsuit. Se-
lection of employment discrimination plaintiffs into filing a fed-
eral lawsuit might cut in either direction. On one hand, 
employers have a financial incentive to settle the most egre-
gious discrimination claims before a lawsuit is filed since such 
claims can result in high damages at trial and, through nega-
tive publicity, can also damage the company’s bottom line.74 On 
the other hand, discrimination victims and the EEOC may have 
opposing incentives when the potential for damages is high. 
Victims may wish to settle and end the matter quickly; still, the 
agency may wish to pursue litigation in order to make an ex-
ample out of the employer. Nowhere can the agency’s potential-
ly conflicting interests better be seen than in the case consid-
ered by the Supreme Court last term, Mach Mining, LLC v. 
EEOC, in which the employer-defendant accused the EEOC of 
failing to engage in the charge conciliation process before filing 
a public interest suit.75 In sum, the farther along in the claim 
resolution process a case sample is drawn, the more claims that 
will have necessarily dropped out—whether due to settlement 
or lack of merit—giving rise to greater concern regarding selec-
tion, representativeness, and inferences drawn from the sam-
ple. 
As a result, the most representative sample of cases should 
come from the outset of the claim resolution process, not the 
end of the process.76 Since all Title VII and ADA discrimination 
lawsuits filed in federal court must first exhaust administrative 
remedies—that is, file a charge with the EEOC (or a state fair 
employment practices agency) and undergo the agency’s admin-
 
 73. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 
434 (2004). 
 74. See Joni Hersch, Equal Employment Opportunity Law and Firm Prof-
itability, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 139, 139–53 (1991) (finding statistically sig-
nificant declines in firm valuations after the announcement of a discrimina-
tion lawsuit, decision, or settlement). 
 75. See Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2015) (allow-
ing federal courts to narrowly review whether the EEOC satisfied its statutory 
obligation to conciliate a discrimination charge with accused employers). 
 76. Indeed, as pathbreaking as the 2011 Best et al. empirical study was, it 
could only make inferences with regard to intersectionality cases that resulted 
in a judicial opinion, not intersectionality cases generally. See Best et al., su-
pra note 37. 
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istrative process—the moment of filing a discrimination charge 
serves as the necessary starting point for the federal claim res-
olution process.77 Charge-filing data, therefore, should provide 
the fullest and most representative picture of the types of dis-
crimination going on in the workplace, and specifically here, the 
incidence of sex-disability intersectional discrimination in the 
workplace. Understanding sex-disability intersectional discrim-
ination from agency charge-filing behavior requires more than 
just aggregate numbers of total charges filed, however; it re-
quires at least some details regarding the characteristics of 
charge-filing parties, the nature of the allegations, and the 
meritoriousness of the claims. Yet for privacy reasons, the 
EEOC makes only the annual number of ADA and Title VII 
charges filed publicly available. 
In the absence of useful publicly available data, this study 
instead uses confidential data obtained from the EEOC through 
a Freedom of Information Act request. The data include at least 
some information on each charge filed with the agency between 
2000 and 2009, although the data vary year-by-year on the 
amount of information provided about each charge.78 The data 
also include the full universe of discrimination charges filed 
with the agency, including charges filed under the statutes at 
issue here (Title VII and the ADA), as well as charges filed un-
der statutes not at issue here (such as the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Genetic Information Non-
discrimination Act (GINA)). The charges filed between 2000 
and 2006, inclusive, contain the most complete information, 
with details regarding the characteristics of the alleged dis-
crimination (including the alleged adverse employment actions 
and other anti-discrimination statutes at issue), the character-
istics of the employer (including the employer’s size, industry, 
and location), and the characteristics of the charging party (in-
cluding the party’s race, sex, and national origin).79 Hence, the 
 
 77. See supra note 16 (describing the nuances of the EEOC filing proce-
dure). 
 78. The confidential EEOC data presented here were first obtained and 
used by Joni Hersch and are used by the author with permission. Hersch has 
previously used the data in an article on sexual harassment. See Joni Hersch, 
Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: PA-
PERS & PROC. 630 (2011) (providing evidence of the relationship between the 
risk of sexual harassment and wages). 
 79. As described in Joni Hersch’s 2011 article using the same data, see id., 
the data on employer industry become highly problematic after 2006. Because 
the EEOC changed how charge intake officers input employer industry into 
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complete range of data from 2000 to 2009 will be examined 
whenever possible, but most of the empirical results presented 
below will focus on the 2000 to 2006 time period. 
B. ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN ADA CHARGES BY SEX? 
As noted in Part II, economists have consistently found the 
wage and employment effects of disability discrimination laws 
more harmful for disabled women than for disabled men, so a 
natural starting point for the present inquiry is to view any in-
tersection between sex and disability discrimination through 
the lens of ADA charges. Figure 1 graphs the number of ADA 
charges filed annually, by sex, between 2000 and 2009 and re-
veals that for the second half of the sample period (2005 to 
2009), women filed, in absolute terms, a greater number of 
ADA charges than did men. When the time period is considered 
as a whole, women on average filed a greater number of ADA 
charges per year, filing approximately 8935 charges annually 
(compared to the approximately 8923 ADA charges filed by men 
annually).80 
 
 
the agency’s computer system, a substantial number of post-2006 charges (in 
some years, more than half of all charges) are missing information on indus-
try. See id. at 631. For this reason, this Article limits much of the empirical 
analysis to the most complete, least problematic charge data, which occurs be-
tween the years 2000 and 2006, inclusive. 
 80. See supra note 78 (introducing Hersch’s confidential dataset used by 
the author). 
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These findings are surprising given that some disabilities 
undoubtedly arise on the job, and yet women, in general, work 
in less risky jobs than do men.81 Moreover, comparing the abso-
lute number of charges filed by sex may not be the right metric. 
Considering the gap in labor force participation between men 
and women—in 2003, for example, there were 14% fewer fe-
male workers in the labor market82—and the fact that EEOC 
complaints can only be filed by individuals in the labor market, 
arguably a more correct metric is comparing the number of per-
worker charges filed by sex. Figure 2 makes precisely this com-
parison for the 2000 to 2009 period, illustrating that the num-
ber of ADA charges filed per female worker are consistently 
higher than the number of ADA charges filed per male worker. 
 
This gender gap only widens after taking into considera-
tion the substantial differential between men’s and women’s 
full-time employment rates. In 2003, for instance, there were 
 
 81. See Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job 
Injury Risks, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 598, 598 (1998) (demonstrating that women 
face a job injury risk that is 71% of men’s job injury risk). If the same share of 
men and women injured on the job file ADA complaints, then more men than 
women should file ADA charges (since more men have on-the-job injuries). 
 82. Information on the annual number of male and female employees in 
the United States comes from Labor Force Statistics from the Current Popula-
tion Survey, BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm#charemp 
(scroll down to find “EMPLOYMENT STATUS”; select either “HTML,” “PDF,” 
or “XLSX” file format of “2. Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional 
population 16 years and over by sex, 1970s to date”) (last visited Nov. 29, 
2016) (utilizing data from the years 2000 to 2009 and referencing a 73.5% la-
bor participation rate for men and a 59.5% labor participation rate for women). 
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approximately 44% fewer full-time female workers in the labor 
market.83 Taking these differences in full-time employment 
numbers into account, Figure 3 demonstrates how significantly 
the gap between men’s and women’s charges widens once the 
metric is the number of ADA charges filed per full-time worker 
by sex. As displayed graphically in Figure 3, women’s annual 
ADA charge-filing rate per 10,000 full-time female workers has 
remained, on average, 42% higher than men’s annual ADA 
charge-filing rate per 10,000 full-time male workers. In fact, in 
the most recent years of the data, women’s ADA charge-filing 
rate per 10,000 full-time workers has persisted at a level more 
than 50% higher than the corresponding men’s rate. As all 
three figures make clear, the gap between men’s and women’s 
ADA charge-filing rates is considerable and enduring, which is 
consistent with—although certainly not determinative of—an 
intersectionality between sex and disability discrimination. 
 
Indeed, after viewing this sizable, yet previously undocu-
mented, difference between men’s and women’s charge-filing 
rates, one question looms large—why are disabled women filing 
more ADA charges per worker? The remaining Sections in Part 
II will address three potential explanations for the sex differen-
 
 83. See id. (scroll down to find “CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EM-
PLOYED”; select either “HTML,” “PDF,” or “XLSX” file format of “12. Em-
ployed persons by sex, occupation, class of worker, full- or part-time status, 
and race”). 
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tial. The first two hypotheses explore the possibility that the 
sex differential is not driven by intersectionality of sex and dis-
ability discrimination; in other words, these hypotheses do not 
consider whether disability discrimination is exacerbated by 
sex discrimination (or vice versa). The first hypothesis behind 
the differential examines whether women may be more likely to 
be incapacitated by a disability. Even if women are not more 
likely to be incapacitated by a disability, the second hypothesis 
considers whether women may be more likely to complain 
about a disability than men, or whether women may be more 
likely to report incidences of disability discrimination than are 
men. Finally, the third hypothesis explicitly considers the role 
of intersectionality, asking whether disabled women experience 
more frequent discrimination in the labor market than do disa-
bled men. After using the available data to evaluate each hy-
pothesis, the remaining text of this Part will argue that the 
third hypothesis of intersectionality must prevail, given the in-
terconnectedness of sex and disability discrimination charge-
filing rates. 
C. ARE WOMEN MORE LIKELY TO BE DISABLED? 
To evaluate the validity of the first hypothesis—that wom-
en are more likely to become disabled than are men—requires 
identifying conditions that solely or disproportionately affect 
women. The most obvious reason why women may become dis-
abled at higher rates than men is pregnancy, yet exploring the 
relationship between disability and pregnancy requires a more 
careful examination of the EEOC charge data. Although the 
EEOC charge data do not generally report the charge-filing 
party’s underlying disabling condition, the data do include 
whether the disability charge is maternity-related and whether 
the disability charge was simultaneously filed with a Title VII 
pregnancy discrimination charge. Table 1 relays the summary 
statistics for the EEOC data on ADA charges filed during the 
period of most complete charge information, from 2000 to 
2006.84 Table 1 does not suggest any strong connection between 
pregnancy and women’s higher rate of disability charge filing: 
less than 1% of women’s ADA claims involve maternity, and on-
 
 84. See supra note 79 (detailing why the most complete EEOC charge data 
run from 2000 to 2006, which is why most are limited to this time period). 
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ly 1.5% of women filing an ADA claim simultaneously file a Ti-
tle VII pregnancy discrimination claim.85 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of ADA Charges and 
Charge-Filing Parties, 2000–2006 
 Percent of Men’s 
Charges 
Percent of Women’s 
Charges 
Demographics:   
Nonwhite 34.9 37.8*** 
Foreign National Origin 11.1 9.4*** 
Over 40 67.9 65.4*** 
Large Employer (501+) 41.8 43.2*** 
ADA Issues Raised:   
Termination 56.9 56.1 
Accommodation 26.8 32.5*** 
Hiring 9.3 6.4*** 
Maternity 0.002 0.2*** 
Statutes Raised in Charge:   
ADA Only 61.4 57.5*** 
ADA + ADEA 21.8 17.7*** 
ADA + Title VII 24.6 33.4*** 
  + Title VII (Sex) 5.7 16.3*** 
  + Title VII (Pregnancy) 0.03 1.5*** 
  + Title VII (Race, Black) 9.2 9.7*** 
N 41,356 39,473 
Difference by sex significant at *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level 
 
Of course, other medical conditions besides pregnancy may 
incapacitate women at higher rates than men. Women, for ex-
ample, report higher rates of rheumatoid arthritis,86 although 
arthritis does not always limit an individual’s ability to work. 
While the EEOC data do not report the charge-filing party’s 
 
 85. Given the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Young v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355–56 (2015) (holding that a plaintiff seeking 
protection under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act may prove a prima facie 
case using the McDonnell Douglas framework), rates of maternity-related 
ADA claims will undoubtedly increase in the near future. Nonetheless, the da-
ta presented here record high rates of disability charges filed by women many 
years before Young arose. 
 86. Men, on the other hand, report higher rates of heart-related disabili-
ties. See Ctr. for Research on Women with Disabilities, Demographics, BAYLOR 
COLL. OF MED., https://www.bcm.edu/research/centers/research-on-women 
-with-disabilities/general-info/demographics (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
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underlying disabling condition, data from the 2009–2014 Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS), a publicly available dataset ad-
ministered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, can provide 
greater insight into the relative rates of functional limitations 
in women and men nationwide. Since 2009, respondents to the 
CPS March Annual Demographic Supplement have reported 
whether they experience difficulty in seeing, hearing, walking, 
dressing, remembering, or running errands.87 According to the 
CPS data, summarized below in Table 2, men and women self-
report functional limitations at very similar rates.88 A slightly 
larger percentage of men report hearing difficulties, while a 
slightly larger percentage of women report difficulties walking 
and running errands. Still, the proportion of all men and wom-
en reporting at least one of the above functional limitations is 
identical at 7.5%. In fact, the percentage of men with work ex-
perience reporting at least one functional limitation is slightly 
higher than the percentage of women with work experience re-
porting one. Consequently, the CPS data indicate that women 
are no more likely to be functionally limited by a disability than 
are men. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87. The CPS March Annual Demographic Supplement is available in a 
user-friendly format from the NBER CPS Supplements, NAT’L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/data/current-population-survey-data.html 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 88. See supra note 86 (introducing NBER CPS Supplements data). 
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Table 2: Percent of Population with Self-Reported 
Functional Limitations, by Sex and Work History, 
2009–2014 
 Men Women 
Reported Functional  
Limitation 
All Men Men  
with Work 
Experience 
All  
Women 
Women  
with Work  
Experience 
Seeing 1.0 5.4 1.1 0.6 
Hearing 1.9 1.3 1.1 0.8 
Walking 3.8 1.3 4.5 1.7 
Dressing 1.1 0.3 1.2 0.3 
Remembering 2.7 1.0 2.7 1.0 
Running Errands 2.1 0.5 2.5 0.6 
One or More  
Limitations 
7.5 3.7 7.5 3.6 
N 341,804 281,097 370,564 263,770 
Note: Estimates calculated from the 2009–2014 CPS Annual Demographic 
Supplement for adults ages 18 to 65, inclusive. 
 
The CPS data indicate that women are no more likely to 
develop a functional limitation than are men, but perhaps it is 
the case that when women do develop such a limitation, it has 
a greater impact on their ability to work. For instance, if the 
types of functional limitations experienced by women have a 
more direct impact on common job tasks than the limitations 
experienced by men, then the issue of disability might arise 
more frequently for women in the workplace, which in turn, 
could lead to their filing disability discrimination charges 
against employers at higher rates than men. Yet if the average 
disabled woman is more functionally limited for the purposes of 
the workplace than the average disabled man, we might also 
expect to see a parallel trend in rates of Social Security Disabil-
ity Insurance (SSDI) enrollment by sex—that is, we might ex-
pect to see more women collecting SSDI.89 In fact, as seen below 
in Figure 4,90 the opposite pattern is apparent in SSDI receipt 
by sex, with men consistently collecting disability payments at 
 
 89. An interesting comparison might also arise from the total number of 
SSDI applications filed by sex. Unfortunately, the sex-differentiated data are 
not publicly available. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, & STATISTICS, 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2014, at 145–59 (2015), https://www.ssa 
.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2014/di_asr14.pdf (providing data on the out-
comes of applications for disability benefits). 
 90. The data in Figure 4 comes from id. 
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higher rates than women. Part of this differential, of course, is 
driven by the underlying difference in labor market participa-
tion by sex, since only individuals with a work history are eligi-
ble to collect.91 Still, even after accounting for men’s higher la-
bor market participation rate, men still collect SSDI at higher 
rates than do women. Between 1993 (the year Title I of the 
ADA went into effect) and 2009, approximately fifty-four men 
out of every 10,000 male workers collected SSDI annually, but 
only fifty women out of every 10,000 female workers collected 
SSDI.92 
 
In sum, nothing in the data supports the idea that women 
are more likely to be disabled than are men. As a group, women 
do not experience higher rates of functional limitations than do 
men, nor do they experience higher rates of work-related func-
tional limitations than do men. Thus, if higher rates of disabil-
ity are not driving the higher rates of disability discrimination 
charge filing among women, something else must be responsi-
ble for the sex differential. The next Section considers a second 
 
 91. See Benefits Planner: Social Security Credits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/credits.html#&a0=2 (last visited Nov. 29, 2016) 
(describing the Social Security credit structure of eligibility). 
 92. These estimates were calculated using the numbers in Figure 4 (ob-
tained from the Social Security Administration), see supra note 89, and divid-
ing them by the estimates of total workers, by gender, from the CPS, see supra 
note 82. 
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possible driver: the idea that women are more willing to raise 
the issue of a disability in the workplace. 
D. ARE WOMEN MORE LIKELY TO COMPLAIN ABOUT A 
DISABILITY? 
Another possible explanation for women’s higher ADA 
charge-filing rates may be that women are more willing to raise 
the issue of their disability with their employer. The stereotype 
that women complain more than men is not borne out by the 
psychology literature, which instead concludes that men and 
women complain equally, but about different topics.93 Still, dis-
ability in the workplace may be one of the topics about which 
women are more willing to complain to an employer. Suppose, 
for instance, that women do not feel as stigmatized by their 
disabilities as do men; they may be more willing to speak to 
their employer about their disability and to ask for an accom-
modation as a result. If true, a greater willingness to raise the 
issue of disability may translate into differences in the types of 
disability claims brought by men and women—women, for ex-
ample, may raise the issue early on, at the hiring stage or as 
soon as their disability poses a problem for their workplace 
productivity, while men might wait to raise the issue until their 
disability becomes unbearably problematic. 
A closer examination of the characteristics of men’s and 
women’s disability discrimination charges should provide in-
sight regarding the timing of women versus men making their 
disabilities known to employers. Looking back at Table 1, the 
clear majority of both men’s and women’s ADA charges allege 
 
 93. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT 166 (Feb. 2015) (“Among dual-earning couples, the likelihood of re-
porting work-family conflict has become especially pronounced among fa-
thers.”); Joanna Wolfe & Elizabeth Powell, Gender and Expressions of Dissat-
isfaction: A Study of Complaining in Mixed-Gendered Student Work Groups, 
29 WOMEN & LANGUAGE 13, 13 (2006) (“Women were more likely than men to 
use complaints as an indirect request for action, while men were more likely to 
use complaints to excuse behavior or to make themselves seem superior.”); 
Yinlong Zhang et al., How Males and Females Differ in Their Likelihood of 
Transmitting Negative Word of Mouth, 40 J. CONSUMER RES. 1097 (2014) 
(finding difference in men’s and women’s willingness to complain to friends 
versus strangers); see also Mark Fahey et al., Men Work Longer, Women Com-
plain More: Survey, CNBC (June 29, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/29/ 
women-feel-more-burned-out-at-work-survey.html (discussing a recent survey 
conducted by the Staples Corporation finding that women are more likely to 
complain about long work hours than are men, but men’s and women’s prima-
ry concerns in the workplace are quite different). 
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wrongful termination. Even though a slightly greater percent-
age (5.7) of women’s ADA charges involve a failure to reasona-
bly accommodate, more men file ADA claims that allege hiring 
discrimination. These numbers suggest that female workers 
are not, as a group, bringing up the issue of disability with em-
ployers earlier than male workers, since at least some men 
(and perhaps more men than women) speak to employers about 
their disabilities as early as the hiring stage.94 
Furthermore, if it were true that women complain more 
about their disabilities to employers, then it should translate 
into real differences in the outcomes of women’s and men’s dis-
ability discrimination charges. A greater willingness to com-
plain about disability (and about disability discrimination) in 
the workplace by one sex should also render workers of that sex 
more willing to file discrimination charges in less meritorious 
cases. The idea here is that if men are more hesitant than 
women to raise the issues of disability and disability discrimi-
nation with their employers, then they will only raise such is-
sues (and, if necessary, file a discrimination charge) under the 
most egregious of circumstances. The result would be that 
men’s disability discrimination charges, on average, would be 
more meritorious than women’s disability discrimination 
charges, and in turn, more successful in obtaining relief than 
women’s charges. But in fact, examining the actual EEOC 
charge data reveal no systematic differences in the outcomes of 
men’s and women’s disability discrimination charges. For each 
disability discrimination charge in the 2000 through 2009 
EEOC data, the agency intake officer assigned an initial rat-
ing.95 After briefly reviewing the facts of the alleged discrimina-
 
 94. Table 1 may suggest that more men than women are raising the issue 
of their disability at the hiring stage, since more men than women ultimately 
file hiring discrimination charges based on disability. Nonetheless, caution 
must be taken in reading too much into the numbers in Table 1 since they rep-
resent only men and women who raised the issue of disability with employers 
and subsequently experienced an adverse employment action. Suppose more 
women actually raise the issue of disability at the hiring stage, but employers 
are more likely to accommodate and hire women than men who raise the issue 
of disability at hiring. If true, the numbers in Table 1 could result, with more 
men claiming hiring discrimination on the basis of disability, even though 
more women raise the issue of disability at the hiring stage. 
 95. Discrimination charges are typically filed in person during an intake 
appointment at the EEOC. They may, however, be filed by mail. Regardless of 
how a worker chooses to file a discrimination charge, each charge is initially 
assigned to and assessed by an agency intake officer. For a description of the 
charge filing process, see How To File a Charge of Employment Discrimina-
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tory incident during the charge intake appointment, the officer 
designated the discrimination charge as one of the following: 
“A: Likely reasonable cause,” “B: Need to investigate,” or “C: 
Likely to dismiss for no reasonable cause.” The breakdown of 
intake charge ratings, by sex, is shown below in Figure 5. 
As Figure 5 makes clear, men’s and women’s charge intake 
ratings are quite similar. The majority of charges are B-rated, 
regardless of sex of the charge-filing party. Moreover, a slightly 
greater percentage of men’s disability charges are C-rated. As 
long as EEOC intake officers’ assessments of discrimination 
charge merit are generally accurate, Figure 5 appears to refute 
any notion that men’s disability charges, on the whole, are 
more meritorious than women’s charges. Further supporting 
this conclusion is evidence from a smaller subset of the EEOC 
charge data. Each charge in the 2000 through 2006 EEOC data 
contains information on the agency’s final determination of 
charge merit at the end of its investigation process.96 Figure 6, 
 
tion, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
employees/howtofile.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 96. According to the EEOC, “How we investigate a charge depends on the 
facts of the case and the kinds of information we need to gather. In some cas-
es, we visit the employer to hold interviews and gather documents. In other 
instances, we interview witnesses and ask for documents. After we finish our 
investigation, we will let you and the employer know the result.” See What You 
Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). The 
agency claims on its website that charges, on average, take approximately ten 
months to investigate. See id. However, the average charge investigation peri-
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below, compares the final agency determination of disability 
discrimination charges by sex. More than half of all ADA 
charges are dismissed after investigation by the EEOC for no 
reasonable cause, although the dismissal rate is higher for men 
than for women.97 57.62% of men’s disability charges result in 
dismissal, compared to 55.92% of women’s disability charges; 
furthermore, this 1.70 percentage point difference in dismissal 
rates by sex is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Together, Figures 5 and 6 indicate that men’s lower disa-
bility charge-filing rates are not the result of men’s willingness 
to file charges only for the most egregious of discriminatory in-
cidents. Men’s and women’s disability discrimination charges, 
on average, are equally meritorious. The fact that men’s and 
women’s disability charges are equally meritorious when con-
sidered as a whole—but women are filing more disability dis-
crimination charges than are men—gives rise to a third, and 
final, explanation for women’s higher charge-filing rates: disa-
 
od can vary dramatically by field office (that is, how sufficiently a field office is 
staffed and funded). Telephone Interview with Katharine Kores, Dist. Dir. of 
Memphis Office, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (Jan. 9, 2012) (esti-
mating that charges in her office, on average, take approximately one year to 
investigate). 
 97. Of course, charge dismissal for no reasonable cause by the EEOC does 
not prevent the charge filer from suing the employer. The charge filer may still 
request a notice-of-right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, even if his or her charge 
has been dismissed by the agency for no reasonable cause. See Filing a Law-
suit, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
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bled women encounter greater discrimination in the labor mar-
ket than do disabled men. 
E. ARE WOMEN MORE LIKELY TO BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST 
BECAUSE OF A DISABILITY? 
Without strong empirical evidence to support either the 
hypothesis that women are more likely to become disabled or 
the hypothesis that women are more likely to complain or leave 
work because of a disability, a final question arises: Do disabled 
women experience greater discrimination in the labor market 
than disabled men? The idea is not completely without prece-
dent. Using data from the 1980s, economists Marjorie Baldwin 
and William Johnson demonstrated that disabled men earned 
higher wages than did disabled women—even after taking into 
account other observables such as education, occupation, and 
experience—leading the authors to conclude that disabled 
women might face a “double burden of discrimination” in the 
labor market.98 Although Baldwin and Johnson’s study was 
groundbreaking, unclear from their results was whether sex 
discrimination and disability discrimination were additive or 
compounding in nature. If additive, then the current legal 
treatment of sex discrimination and disability discrimination 
separately would be appropriate; compounding discrimination, 
on the other hand, would lead to precisely the same types of is-
sues discussed throughout the legal scholarship on 
intersectionality.99 
Figure 7 takes a significant step towards resolving the na-
ture of the relationship between sex discrimination and disabil-
ity discrimination. Using the 2000 through 2006 EEOC charge 
data—the subset of the data that contains the industry of the 
charge-filing party100—Figure 7 graphs the number of charges 
filed per 10,000 workers, by sex and industry. The industries in 
Figure 7 are ordered quite intentionally: beginning with the 
most female-dominated industry, health care (where females 
 
 98. See Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Dis-
crimination Against Women with Disabilities, 34 INDUS. REL. 555, 575 (1995). 
 99. Although Baldwin and Johnson concluded that gender discrimination 
was no worse for disabled women than it was for non-disabled women, the au-
thors suspected that gender and disability discrimination had a compounding 
effect, not an additive effect. See id. (“[E]fforts to reduce discrimination 
against women with disabilities will not be effective if they are based on the 
idea that gender is irrelevant.”). 
 100. See supra note 78 (introducing Hersch’s confidential dataset used by 
the author). 
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comprised 79.4% of the workforce in 2003), and ending with the 
most male-dominated industry, construction (where females 
comprised only 9.6% of the workforce in 2003).101 The underly-
ing reasoning behind this ordering is to test whether reported 
instances of disability discrimination increase as the likelihood 
of sex discrimination increases. A wealth of empirical scholar-
ship indicates that sex discrimination is most pervasive for 
women working in male-dominated arenas and least pervasive 
for women working in female-dominated arenas.102 
 
 
 
 101. The percent of men in each industry is as follows: health care (21%), 
educational services (31%), finance and insurance (41%), accommodation 
(47%), other services (49%), retail trade (51%), real estate (53%), public admin-
istration (54%), arts (55%), professional services (55%), information (57%), 
management (60%), manufacturing (69%), wholesale trade (70%), agriculture 
(75%), transportation (75%), utilities (77%), mining (86%), and construction 
(90%). Data on the gender makeup of each major industry comes from the 
midpoint year, 2003, of the CPS. Labor Force Statistics: Employed Persons by 
Industry, Sex, Race, and Occupation, BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/ 
cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#emp (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 102. See, e.g., Hersch, supra, note 78, at 633 (finding that sexual harass-
ment charge-filing rates are highest for women in male-dominated industries). 
See generally Peter Glick et al., What Mediates Sex Discrimination in Hiring 
Decisions?, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 178, 184–86 (1988) (conclud-
ing that sex stereotyping is mediated when the sex of the applicant matches 
perceptions of the appropriate sex for the job); Jennifer Steele et al., Learning 
in a Man’s World: Examining the Perceptions of Undergraduate Women in 
Male-Dominated Academic Areas, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 46, 49–50 (2002) 
(reporting that female undergraduates in male-dominated majors report high-
er rates of discrimination and stereotyping). 
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Figure 7 is highly suggestive that sex discrimination and 
disability discrimination have a compounding, not an additive, 
effect. For men working in health care and education, where 
women comprise more than two-thirds of the workforce, men 
file 27.5% and 45.6% more charges per worker than women, re-
spectively. In industries where men and women make up simi-
lar percentages of the workforce, men and women file almost 
identical numbers of ADA charges per worker. On the other 
hand, women working in industries where they are severely 
underrepresented—such as agriculture, mining, and construc-
tion—file 118.9%, 84.8%, and 176.4% more ADA charges per 
worker, respectively. Since perceived riskiness of jobs in the ed-
ucation industry may be low, while perceived riskiness of jobs 
in the construction and mining industries may be high,103 one 
potential alternative reading of this pattern in charge-filing 
rates is that women’s disability charge-filing rates are positive-
 
 103. Of course, perceived job riskiness may not match actual job riskiness. 
See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and 
Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29, 29–30 (2004) (contrasting the value of statisti-
cal life studies that use objective job risk measures versus subjective job risk 
measures). 
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ly correlated with job risk, and men’s disability charge-filing 
rates are inversely correlated with job risk. 
Yet this alternative explanation loses its footing once the 
actual riskiness of jobs, by industry, is explored.104 The current 
“gold standard” of actual job risk data by industry comes from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).105 The BLS collects annu-
al data on both nonfatal workplace injuries (through the Sur-
vey of Occupational Illnesses and Industries (SOII) data) and 
fatal workplace injuries (through the Census of Fatal Occupa-
tional Injuries (CFOI) data).106 According to the 2003 SOII data, 
the female-dominated health care industry has one of the high-
est rates of nonfatal workplace injuries, with 650 nonfatal inju-
ries per 10,000 workers, just behind construction (680 injuries), 
mining (680 injuries), and transportation and warehousing (780 
injuries).107 Similarly, the 2003 CFOI data reveal that the male-
dominated information (56.5% male) and manufacturing (69.4% 
male) industries have some of the lowest fatality rates of any 
industry, with rates of 0.18 and 0.25 fatalities per 10,000 work-
ers, respectively.108 For comparison, the female-dominated 
health care and education industries have rates of 0.07 and 
0.12 fatalities per 10,000 workers, respectively.109 And yet, Fig-
ure 7 reveals many more women than men file disability dis-
crimination charges in the information and manufacturing in-
dustries. 
Instead of tracking underlying job risk, the pattern of disa-
bility charge-filing rates by sex most closely tracks the proba-
bility of encountering sex discrimination on the job. Figure 7 
reveals that the pattern is not only apparent for women, but al-
so for men. Men file more disability charges per worker in the 
two industries where they are most severely underrepresented, 
 
 104. Accord Hersch, supra note 81, at 606 (concluding that women face 
much greater risks in the workplace than previously believed and that “their 
injury experience is considerable”). 
 105. For a description of the different types of occupational risk data avail-
able, see W. Kip Viscusi, Policy Challenges of the Heterogeneity of the Value of 
Statistical Life, 6 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 99, 138–48 (2011). 
 106. Summary statistics from both annual datasets are available from the 
BLS website. See Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities (2016), BUREAU LAB. 
STATS., http://www.bls.gov/iif (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 107. See Industry Injury and Illness Data (2003), BUREAU LAB. STATS, 
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshsum.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 108. See Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) – Current and Re-
vised Data (2003), BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 109. See id. 
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education and health care. The reason that, on average, women 
file more disability discrimination charges per worker than do 
men (as seen previously in Figures 1, 2, and 3) is because there 
are more industries in which women are the minority. This idea 
that disability discrimination serves to exacerbate underlying 
sex discrimination in the workplace is further driven home in 
Figure 8. Figure 8 graphs the percentage of ADA charges filed 
with the EEOC from 2000 to 2006 that simultaneously include 
a Title VII sex discrimination charge, by industry and sex. 
Again, the industries are ordered from the most female-
dominated industry to the most male-dominated industry. 
 
Figure 8 indicates a similar inverse relationship between 
the likelihood of filing a Title VII sex charge (in addition to the 
ADA charge) and representation of a disabled individual’s sex 
in the industry. Thus, in the health care industry, where nearly 
four out of five employees are female, a slightly greater per-
centage of men file a Title VII sex charge in addition to an ADA 
  
2017] THE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED SEX 1135 
 
charge.110 As the percentage of male employees in the industry 
increases, men filing an ADA charge are less likely to file a 
simultaneous Title VII sex charge, and women filing an ADA 
charge are more likely to file a simultaneous Title VII sex 
charge. The gap between male and female charges that allege 
both disability and sex discrimination is widest in the indus-
tries that are strongly male-dominated, such as mining and 
construction. 
Furthermore, this relationship between filing an ADA 
charge and a Title VII sex discrimination charge holds even af-
ter accounting for the effects of other, potentially correlated, ob-
servables. Table 3 reports the results of a linear probability es-
timate111 of the likelihood of filing a Title VII sex discrimination 
charge in addition to an ADA charge, using the 2000 to 2006 
EEOC charge data. After controlling for differences in race, age, 
national origin, employer characteristics (government employer, 
large employer, or employer region), and the year of charge fil-
ing, women in industries that are 50 to 66% male (“male-
majority industries” in Table 3) are 11.5 percentage points more 
likely than men in these industries to file a Title VII sex dis-
crimination charge in addition to their ADA charge. Women in 
industries that are more than 66% male (“male-dominated in-
dustries” in Table 3) are 18.8 percentage points more likely 
than men in these industries to file a Title VII sex discrimina-
tion charge in addition to their ADA charge.112 Although caution 
must be exercised in interpreting these results causally, these 
linear probability estimates are nonetheless enlightening, be-
cause they show that the compounding relationship between 
disability discrimination and minority gender status in an in-
dustry persists even after accounting for additional, potentially 
correlated characteristics of ADA charge-filing parties. 
 
 110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 111. A linear probability model estimates the relationship between a vari-
able of interest (here being a woman in a male-dominated industry) on the 
probability of an outcome of interest (here filing a Title VII sex charge in addi-
tion to an ADA charge) using ordinary least squares estimation. For more in-
formation on linear probability models, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMET-
RIC ANALYSIS 665–727 (7th ed. 2012) (comparing the linear probability model 
to probit and logit models, which are also used to estimate probabilities). 
 112. Estimates are constructed to examine the probability of a woman fil-
ing a Title VII sex charge (in addition to an ADA charge), relative to a man 
filing a Title VII sex charge, since women are the minority in more industries 
than are men. The estimates could easily be reversed, however, to estimate 
instead the probability of filing a Title VII sex charge (in addition to an ADA 
charge) among men in female-dominated industries. 
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Table 3: Linear Probability Estimate of Filing a Title 
VII Sex Discrimination Charge Among Individuals 
Who File an ADA Charge, 2000–2006 
 
 Dependent Variable: File Title VII 
Sex Charge 
Female 0.081*** 
(0.003) 
Nonwhite -0.006** 
(0.003) 
Over 40 -0.006** 
(0.003) 
Male-Majority Industry -0.001 
(0.003) 
Male-Dominated Industry -0.022*** 
(0.003) 
Female*Male-Majority Industry 0.034*** 
(0.005) 
Female*Male-Dominated Industry 0.107*** 
(0.009) 
N 63,048 
R2 0.035 
Coefficient significant at *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level 
Notes: Estimates include controls for foreign national origin, large em-
ployer (501+), government employer, region of employer, and year filed. 
Male-majority industries are 50 to 66% male. Male-dominated industries 
are more than 66% male. 
 
Taken together, the empirical findings presented in this 
Section strongly suggest that sex and disability discrimination 
intersect much in the same, well-documented way that race and 
sex discrimination intersect. The unfortunate results of this in-
tersection for disabled female workers, and particularly disa-
bled female workers in male-dominated industries, are discrim-
inatory wage and employment effects that far surpass their 
disabled male peers. In light of the data presented here, the 
next Part steps back and considers alternative explanations for 
the sex-disability discrimination connection, but ultimately 
concludes that it is intersectionality that renders the effects of 
labor market discrimination particularly harsh for disabled 
women. 
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III.  CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR 
THE SEX-DISABILITY CONNECTION   
Skeptics of the intersectionality theory might view the data 
presented in the previous Part and remain unconvinced that 
sex discrimination exacerbates disability discrimination in the 
workplace. Alternative explanations, such skeptics might ar-
gue, could easily explain the relationship between likelihood of 
filing a disability discrimination charge and the sex ratio in a 
worker’s industry. This Part considers two of the most compel-
ling alternative explanations for the gendered nature of disabil-
ity discrimination: (1) the propensity of sex discrimination 
charge filers to file a discrimination charge on as many grounds 
as possible; and (2) the role of the built environment in the 
workplace. Nonetheless, even after thorough consideration, 
these alternative explanations fail to fully explain the relation-
ship between sex and disability discrimination documented in 
Part II. 
A. THE ROLE OF EVERYTHING BUT THE KITCHEN SINK 
Perhaps the most obvious alternative explanation for the 
sex-disability discrimination charge-filing connection presented 
in Part II is one that relies on both women’s relative propensity 
to file a discrimination charge of any type against their employ-
ers and the behavior of charge filers during the intake process. 
This alternative explanation proceeds in the following manner: 
workers, whether male or female, who believe they have been 
discriminated against in the workplace seek retribution against 
offending employers. As a result, when these workers file a dis-
crimination charge with the EEOC, they are motivated to en-
sure that the employer is found liable for at least some type of 
wrongdoing. With seemingly nothing to lose by claiming multi-
ple grounds of discrimination,113 workers are motivated to check 
every box on the charge intake form—alleging everything but 
the kitchen sink—and claim that the offending employer en-
gaged in every type of prohibited discrimination. Although all 
charge-filers engage in this kitchen-sinking behavior, regard-
less of sex, there are more female charge filers since sex dis-
 
 113. One questionable aspect of this hypothesis is that charge filers have 
nothing to lose by checking every box on the EEOC’s charge intake form. If 
charge filers claim all types of discrimination—including types of discrimina-
tion that they did not actually experience—it may cause the agency to take the 
charge less seriously. 
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crimination is more common against women than against 
men.114 The end result is that more women file disability dis-
crimination charges against employers simply because they file 
more discrimination charges in general. Moreover, according to 
this alternative explanation, the relationship between industry 
sex ratio and disability charge-filing rates should not be sur-
prising since women experience more sex discrimination in 
male-dominated industries, and women’s higher rates of sex 
discrimination charge filing are driving the entire mechanism. 
Evaluating the validity of this hypothesis requires first de-
termining the ratio of female to male discrimination charge-
filers. It is true that the strong majority of Title VII sex dis-
crimination charges are filed by women; between 2000 and 
2009, the EEOC received 246,367 charges that raised a Title 
VII sex discrimination claim.115 Of the filings for which the par-
ty’s sex is reported (sex is not reported for 5406, or 2.19% of the 
sex discrimination charges), 50,382 charges were filed by men 
(20.91% of charges) and 190,579 charges were filed by women 
(79.09% of charges). However, when the data are analyzed 
across all relevant statutes—including other types of Title VII 
claims, the ADA, the ADEA, and GINA—it is not true that 
women file disproportionately more charges than men. Between 
2000 and 2009, the EEOC received charges from 886,383 
unique charge filers under all statutes that it administers.116 Of 
the charges in which the filing party’s sex is reported (sex is not 
reported for 27,296, or 3.08%, of all 886,383 unique charge fil-
ers), 471,563 of all charge filers were female (53.20%), and 
387,524 of all charge filers were male (46.80%). Already, the 
close to fifty-fifty split of male-to-female charge filers calls this 
alternative hypothesis into question. 
Nonetheless, the next step in evaluating this alternative 
hypothesis is determining whether charge-filers kitchen sink 
their claims and whether such behavior differs meaningfully by 
sex. According to the 2000 through 2009 data for which sex is 
reported,117 men’s EEOC charges, on average, raise 1.18 unique 
 
 114. Sex discrimination is in fact more common against women than men, 
but it is nonetheless an issue for men in many workplaces—over 20% of all Ti-
tle VII sex discrimination charge filers are men. 
 115. See Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Sex is reported in 96.92% of the 2000 through 2009 EEOC data. 
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statutes; women’s EEOC charges, by contrast, raise an average 
of 1.20 unique statutes. Although this difference is statistically 
different at the 5% level, the magnitude of the difference is un-
doubtedly quite small. Moreover, these summary statistics do 
not provide very compelling evidence of systematic, kitchen-
sinking behavior by charge filers of either sex. Nor is there 
strong evidence of kitchen sinking at the ends of the charge-
filer distribution. The median charge-filer, whether male or fe-
male, raises only one statute in his or her charge. Similarly, 
charge filers in both the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percen-
tiles of the distribution raise just one statute, regardless of 
their sex. Considered together, these figures indicate that 
kitchen-sinking behavior is the exception, not the rule, in 
EEOC charge filing. 
A final method of assessing this alternative hypothesis is 
to examine EEOC charge-filing behavior by sex with respect to 
other employment discrimination statutes. The kitchen-sinking 
hypothesis claims that women file more disability charges per 
worker than do men because women encounter more sex dis-
crimination in the workplace than do men. Instead of simply 
filing a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC, these women 
allegedly kitchen sink their charges, which, in turn, leads to 
higher rates of disability claims among women. But if this hy-
pothesis is true, not only should higher rates of disability dis-
crimination charges result among women, but also higher rates 
of other types of discrimination charges. Thus, a fair compari-
son will be to examine how age discrimination charge-filing 
rates differ by sex,118 as compared to how disability discrimina-
tion charge-filing rates differ by sex. From 2000 to 2009, men 
filed an average of 10,595 ADEA charges per year, but women 
filed only an average of 8933 ADEA charges per year. For com-
parison, during the same time period, men filed an average of 
8923 ADA charges per year, and women filed an average of 
8935 ADA charges per year.119 Thus, while women filed more 
ADA charges than men during this time period, men filed far 
more ADEA charges than women during this period. 
Even when these absolute numbers are normalized to ac-
count for the fewer number of women in the labor market, the 
opposite trends remain in the ADEA and ADA data. From 2000 
 
 118. Recall that the sex-age connection has already received scholarly at-
tention. See Clarke, supra note 52; McLaughlin, supra note 53 and accompa-
nying text; Widiss, supra note 49. 
 119. See supra Figure 2. 
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to 2009, men filed 1.42 ADEA charges per 10,000 male workers, 
and women filed 1.36 ADEA charges per 10,000 female work-
ers. In contrast, men filed 1.19 ADA charges per 10,000 male 
workers, but women filed 1.36 ADA charges per 10,000 female 
workers. Together, these figures refute the notion that women’s 
higher ADA charge-filing rates are simply a byproduct of their 
higher sex discrimination charge-filing rates, combined with 
kitchen-sinking behavior. Instead, these figures point towards 
a unique intersectionality between sex and disability that is 
disparately affecting disabled women in the labor market. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
A second alternative explanation for the higher disability 
charge-filing rates by gender minorities is the built environ-
ment within the industry. Here, the term “built environment” 
signifies the physical features of the workplace.120 At least one 
legal scholar has argued that American workplace environ-
ments have been built with men in mind,121 and likely that as-
sertion is true for the many industries in which men comprise 
the majority of workers. The argument may not be true, how-
ever, for industries like education and health, in which women 
comprise a strong majority of the workers. Instead, the envi-
ronment within a workplace dominated by one sex has likely 
been built with that particular sex in mind. For instance, the 
expected height of desks and chairs and the availability of 
women’s restrooms is probably quite different in workplaces 
 
 120. The term is frequently used by health researchers to refer to: 
spatial distribution of human activities[,] . . . the physical infrastruc-
ture and services that provide the spatial links or connectivity among 
activities[, and] . . . the aesthetic, physical, and functional qualities of 
the built work environment, such as the design of buildings and 
streetscapes, and relates to both land use patterns and the transpor-
tation system. 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Workplace Health Promotion: 
Environmental Assessment, http://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/ 
model/assessment/environmental.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2016); see also Al-
va O. Ferdinand et al., The Relationship Between Built Environments and 
Physical Activity: A Systematic Review, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Oct. 2012, at 
e7, e7–e13. See generally Richard J. Jackson, The Impact of the Built Envi-
ronment on Health: An Emerging Field, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1382 (2003) 
(detailing the role of the “built environment” in the public health field). 
 121. See Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A Disability 
Paradigm of Sex Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1297, 1314–15 (2008) 
(discussing how work environments have been traditionally built for men, and 
considering the ramifications of the traditionally built environment on ac-
commodating disabled women in the workplace). 
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within the education or healthcare industries than in work-
places within the transportation or construction industries.122 
As a result, disabled women in male-dominated industries 
may require additional or costlier accommodations than disa-
bled women in female-dominated industries. Imagine, for in-
stance, a male worker and a female worker in the manufactur-
ing industry; both have irritable bowel syndrome and require 
frequent, easy access to a restroom. Since more than two-thirds 
of the workers in the manufacturing industry are male, men’s 
restrooms likely abound in the work facility, and the employer 
will have to spend little to nothing to ensure that the male 
worker has sufficient restroom access. In contrast, accommo-
dating the female worker may prove more difficult, and more 
costly, since the number of men’s restrooms in the facility al-
most certainly outnumbers the number of women’s restrooms.123 
As the above example demonstrates, employers in male-
dominated industries may be less willing to provide accommo-
dations to disabled females because of the high initial cost to 
provide the accommodation and because of the reduced likeli-
hood that another woman will be able to take advantage of the 
accommodation in the future, given the small number of women 
overall in the industry. If this intuition is correct, then the built 
environment of the workplace may be driving the higher disa-
bility charge rates of gender minorities. A worker of one sex in 
an industry that is strongly dominated by the opposite sex may 
be met with heightened resistance from employers whenever 
the need for a reasonable accommodation arises. The result 
would be more sex-minority members within an industry filing 
reasonable accommodation claims than sex-majority members. 
In essence, this hypothesis implies that differences in reasona-
ble accommodation discrimination charges are driving the sex-
based charge patterns seen by industry in Figure 7. 
If the built environment theory is correct, then the sex dis-
parities in charge-filing rates across industries should be driv-
en, at least in part, by differences in reasonable accommodation 
claims. Figure 9 uses the 2000 through 2006 EEOC charge data 
 
 122. In fact, unequal availability of women’s restrooms has been the sub-
ject of prior litigation. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Toilets as a Feminist Issue: A 
True Story, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 276–87 (1991). 
 123. Restroom access has been the subject of much ADA reasonable ac-
commodation litigation brought by irritable bowel syndrome patients. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 753–55 (6th Cir. 2015); Workman v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 463–64 (6th Cir. 1999); Bracey v. Michigan Bell 
Tel. Co., No. 14-12155, 2015 WL 9434496, at *1–4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2015). 
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to compare the rate of raising an accommodation claim within 
an ADA charge, by sex of the charge-filing party and industry 
(with industries ordered from least male-dominated to most 
male-dominated). Figure 9 is similar to Figure 7, but instead of 
comparing the total number of ADA charges by industry and 
sex (as in Figure 7), Figure 9 compares the percent of ADA 
charges that contain a reasonable accommodation charge. 
 
Figure 9 reveals that women raise accommodation claims 
at higher rates than men, regardless of industry,124 and there is 
no apparent relationship between likelihood of filing an ac-
commodation charge and the gender makeup of a worker’s in-
dustry. Figure 9 casts doubt on the hypothesis that the built 
environment in the workplace is strictly driving the results in 
Figure 7. Neither men nor women appear more likely to seek 
(and be turned down for) accommodation in industries where 
their sex is heavily outnumbered. 
 
 124. Recall from Table 1 that the EEOC charge data summary statistics in 
the Table had already revealed that women, on average, file more reasonable 
accommodation charges than do men, but men file more hiring charges than 
do women. 
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With doubt cast on both the built environment and the 
kitchen-sinking hypotheses, the residual hypothesis is 
intersectionality. The multiplicative effect of being a member of 
more than one minority group appears to be responsible for the 
gendered nature of disability discrimination. The next Part, as 
a result, will consider the realities of intersectional claims un-
der current understandings of employment discrimination 
laws. It will further weigh the potential remedies for victims of 
simultaneous sex and disability discrimination. 
IV.  FINDING A REMEDY FOR SEX-DISABILITY 
INTERSECTIONALITY   
Using employment discrimination charge data from the 
EEOC, this Article has revealed a previously unexplored weak-
ness in U.S. disability laws. Disability discrimination, it seems, 
is not isolated from other types of discrimination; rather, it can 
be exacerbated by other forms of discrimination, and in particu-
lar, by sex discrimination. The compounding effect of disability 
discrimination on top of sex discrimination can impact both 
men and women, but as a practical matter, it impacts more 
women than men. It is most often present when a disabled in-
dividual of one sex works in an industry dominated by mem-
bers of the other sex, and when present, can have potentially 
devastating labor market consequences on its victims. 
Why are the labor market consequences of sex and disabil-
ity intersectional discrimination potentially devastating? As ei-
ther a disabled individual or a member of a minority sex, a 
worker is already at a disadvantage in the labor market. Even 
in the post-ADA period, disabled individuals continue to be less 
likely to be hired than non-disabled individuals, and when they 
do find employment, they earn lower wages than non-disabled 
individuals for performing the same job.125 Similarly, even in 
 
 125. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 948–50 (finding that 
the disability employment penalty in the labor market persists, and may have 
gotten worse, after the passage of the ADA); see also Marjorie L. Baldwin & 
William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with Disabili-
ties in the Year of the ADA, 66 S. ECON. J. 548, 561–64 (2000) (finding that 
physical limitations cannot fully account for the wage penalty encountered by 
disabled men in the labor market, and demonstrating a correlation between 
wages and stigma associated with the underlying disability); Jennifer Bennett 
Shinall, What Happens When the Definition of Disability Changes? The Case of 
Obesity, 5 IZA J. LAB. ECON., 1, 1–31 (2016) (demonstrating that employment 
for at least one disabled group has not improved since the passage of the 2008 
ADA Amendments, which were intended to remedy the shortcomings of the 
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the post-Title VII period, women famously continue to earn less 
than men for performing the same job.126 Just to add these ef-
fects up for members of both minority groups—that is, individ-
uals who are both disabled and a member of an unrepresented 
sex—would already suggest that these individuals face a formi-
dable barrier to success in the labor market. Yet, as demon-
strated by this Article, for disabled sex minorities the effects 
are more than additive; they are multiplicative. 
Furthermore, neither federal disability discrimination law 
nor federal sex discrimination law, as currently enforced, can 
adequately assist victims of intersectional sex-disability dis-
crimination. Wage and employment data both demonstrate that 
disabled women are worse off since the ADA, at least in terms 
of labor market outcomes, than are disabled men.127 These data 
indicate that the current single-dimensional framework of U.S. 
disability law may be inadequate to protect disabled men in the 
workplace, and it is certainly inadequate to protect disabled 
women.128 The framework is insufficient for disabled women, 
because, as the empirical evidence presented here has demon-
strated, disabled women face problems created by claim 
intersectionality that are analogous to the well-explored prob-
 
original Act). 
 126. Exactly how much less women earn than men for performing the same 
job is the source of some debate. President Barack Obama and the media often 
cite the popular statistic that women earn seventy-seven cents for every dollar 
that a man earns. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by 
the President on Equal Pay for Equal Work (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www 
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/08/remarks-president-equal-pay 
-equal-work (“Today, the average full-time working woman earns just 77 
cents for every dollar a man earns; for African-American women, Latinas, it’s 
even less. And in 2014, that’s an embarrassment. It is wrong.”). Yet most 
economists would revise this figure upwards since this number does not take 
into account differences in the occupations, industries, and working hours of 
men and women. See, e.g., Dan A. Black et al., Gender Wage Disparities Among 
the Highly Educated, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 630, 651 (2008) (estimating that 
white women earn approximately ninety-one cents for every dollar that a 
white man earns). 
 127. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 930 (finding that disabled 
women ages twenty-one to thirty-nine worked between 2.37 and 4.57 fewer 
weeks in the years following the implementation of the ADA but disabled men 
ages twenty-one to thirty-nine worked between 0 and 3.11 fewer weeks); 
Beegle & Stock, supra note 56, at 853 (finding that disabled women’s earnings 
declined by 4.9% after passage of a state disability law, but disabled men’s 
earnings declined by only 1.5%). 
 128. Accord Baldwin & Johnson, supra note 98, at 575 (“[E]fforts to reduce 
discrimination against women with disabilities will not be effective if they are 
based on the idea that gender is irrelevant.”). 
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lems faced by African-American women. As prior authors have 
aptly described for the case of African-American women, 
[A]n employer might be willing to hire black men and white women as 
retail salespeople but unwilling to hire black women because he 
thinks that customers will stereotype them in disparaging ways that 
will harm his business. . . . Their employees might make what we call 
intersectional claims: allegations that they were discriminated 
against due to more than one ascriptive characteristic. But since the-
se types of discrimination would not affect minority men or white 
women, under some interpretations of EEO law, the employer could 
parry a claim of race discrimination by pointing to the hiring of men 
belonging to the plaintiffs’ racial group and deflect a claim of sex dis-
crimination by pointing to his hiring of white women.129 
A disabled woman will face precisely the same issue in try-
ing to bring a suit that involves evidence of simultaneous sex 
and disability discrimination. An employer could point to evi-
dence of taking positive employment actions towards disabled 
men to discredit the disability claim; the employer could then 
bring forth evidence of positive treatment of nondisabled wom-
en to discredit the sex claim. If the employer’s evidence is con-
vincing on each front, the disabled woman will lose. She will 
lose because, in general, courts will only consider workplace 
discrimination against her based on each single dimension, not 
on multiple dimensions.130 
Undoubtedly, the lessons of this Article are pessimistic for 
the labor market prospects of disabled workers who are also 
gender minorities within their respective industries. If current 
understandings of employment discrimination law are insuffi-
cient to protect these workers, how can these workers improve 
their legal fate (and, as a result, improve their labor market 
prospects)? The possible legal solutions to the intersectional 
discrimination issues faced by disabled, gender-minority work-
ers are, in one respect, highly similar to those for African-
American women. Both groups require a way to get around 
courts’ unwillingness to view discrimination on more than a 
single dimension. Yet in another respect, the solution for disa-
 
 129. Best et al., supra note 37, at 995; see also Peggie R. Smith, Separate 
Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 21, 28–
29 (1991) (giving similar examples). 
 130. As mentioned previously, disabled men in female-dominated indus-
tries who are victims of sex-disability intersectional discrimination will en-
counter the same problem. Here, I have focused on the example of disabled 
women, however, since sex-disability intersectional discrimination affects 
more women than men (as there are many more male-dominated industries 
than female-dominated industries). 
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bled, gender-minority workers may be more complex. The case 
of African-American female workers asks courts to evaluate a 
discrimination claim multi-dimensionally within the same 
statute, Title VII; the case of disabled, gender-minority workers 
asks courts to evaluate a discrimination claim multi-
dimensionally across two statutes, Title VII and the ADA. And 
even though prior within-statute intersectional claims have not 
fared particularly well in courts,131 prior across-statute claims 
have historically fared even worse.132 With these issues in mind, 
the next two Sections consider the viability of two potential 
remedies for sex-disability intersectional plaintiffs. 
A. AMENDING CURRENT STATUTES 
Even though sex-disability discrimination involves across-
statute intersectional discrimination, previous work on within-
statute intersectional discrimination may still serve as a suita-
ble point of departure. Frustrated with federal courts’ typical 
proclivity towards considering race and sex discrimination sep-
arately (instead of simultaneously), scholars working on with-
 
 131. See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 
142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (“[T]his lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a 
cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively ei-
ther, but not a combination of both . . . .”); see also Cathy Scarborough, Note, 
Conceptualizing Black Women’s Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457, 
1468 (1989) (criticizing cases like DeGraffenreid since “[c]ourts have never di-
vided white women into whites and women, or Black men into Blacks and 
men. Their claims have not been treated as divided because the term ‘Blacks’ 
has been understood to mean Black men, and ‘women’ to mean white women”). 
 132. Most of the prior scholarship on across-statute intersectional claims 
has focused on the intersection of age and sex discrimination, and it has been 
even more pessimistic with regards to plaintiffs’ prospects than the present 
Article. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Pro-
tecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (2003) (“Of the 
courts that have had the opportunity to address the issue, they have either 
declined the invitation to decide the issue, or have recognized the cause of ac-
tion with little or no discussion.”). Although one federal district court has al-
lowed one intersectional sex-age claim to proceed under Title VII and the 
ADEA, see Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1241–42 (E.D. Pa. 1994), feder-
al courts of appeals have required the sex discrimination and age discrimina-
tion claims to proceed separately since they derive from two different statutes. 
See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 
2004) (en banc) (refusing to recognize an intersectional claim under federal 
law brought by a former employee who had allegedly been called a “useless old 
lady” by her supervisors); Sherman v. Am. Cyanmid Co., No. 98-4035, 1999 
WL 701911, at *5 (6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to recognize sex-age intersectional 
claims under federal law). But see Lewis v. CNA Nat. Warranty Corp., 63 F. 
Supp. 3d 959, 962–64 (D. Minn. 2014) (allowing a sex-plus-age claim to pro-
ceed under Minnesota law, not federal law). 
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in-statute, intersectional discrimination against African-
American women have proposed amendments to current em-
ployment discrimination laws.133 These amendments would re-
quire courts to evaluate hybrid evidence of multiple types of 
simultaneous discrimination—that is, to allow explicit intersec-
tional claims—by adding language such as “or any combination 
thereof” after Title VII’s explicit prohibitions against race, col-
or, national origin, sex, and religious discrimination.134 This so-
lution may sound simple in theory, but a closer examination 
reveals both its impracticality and its limitations. 
First, and practically speaking, the chances of an amend-
ment that expands civil rights protections passing both houses 
of Congress seem slight to nonexistent, especially given the 
current political climate.135 True, Congress came together in 
2008 to pass the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments 
Act (ADAAA), which expanded the definition of disability under 
the original ADA by explicitly overturning four U.S. Supreme 
Court cases, and thus expanded preexisting civil rights.136 But 
 
 133. See Areheart, supra note 39, at 234; Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, 
Comment, Women of Color and Employment Discrimination: Race and Gender 
Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159, 173 (1993); Virginia W. 
Wei, Note, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using 
Intersectionality Theory To Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Fac-
tors of Race, Gender, and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 771, 811 (1996). 
 134. Areheart, supra note 39; Castro & Corral, supra note 133, at 172. 
 135. For news articles discussing the recent inability of Congress to pass 
major legislation on important issues, including issues on which both Demo-
crats and Republicans agree, see James Fallows, The Tragedy of the American 
Military, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516 (describing the 
2013–2014 Congressional term as “unusually short and historically unproduc-
tive”); Ed Hornick, Why Can’t Congress Just Get Along?, CNN (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/10/11/congress.problems (describing Con-
gress’s inability to get legislation passed as “pathetic but not unexpected. This 
is really what we’ve come to expect from this divided Congress”); Carl Hulse, 
No Room for Compromise and, Again, No Room for Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2016, at A12 (blaming Congress’s ability to pass a gun bill, despite agree-
ment on some points between both parties, on “partisanship, a reluctance to 
compromise and the influence of powerful special interests”); see also Ed 
O’Keefe, ENDA, Explained, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/11/04/what-is-the-employment-non 
-discrimination-act-enda (documenting proponents’ long, unsuccessful struggle 
to pass another civil rights bill, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, to 
protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender employees from discrimina-
tion). 
 136. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act § 2(a), Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“[T]he holdings of the Supreme Court in 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases 
  
1148 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1099 
 
those particular amendments to the ADA arose in a very differ-
ent context than would the intersectionality amendments pro-
posed by prior scholars. The ADAAA was a direct reaction to 
the tremendous amount of litigation regarding the definition of 
disability, which Congress had failed to define fully in the orig-
inal version of the ADA,137 and the restrictive judicial decisions 
that had rendered the act inapplicable to many individuals in 
need of its protections.138 Moreover, the ADAAA was passed in 
the context of empirical evidence that the original Act had ac-
tually harmed the labor market prospects of the intended pro-
tected class, disabled individuals.139 In contrast, intersectional 
scholarship, including the present Article, has presented evi-
dence that federal discrimination statutes have not helped the 
labor market prospects of individuals who are members of mul-
tiple protected classes.140 
Second, the legislative history of Title VII at least points to 
an argument that courts should already be considering inter-
sectional discrimination claims, even without an amendment to 
the statutory language. During the floor debate on Title VII, 
Representative John Dowdy introduced an amendment to add 
the word “solely”141 prior to the then-bill’s prohibitions on dis-
crimination “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”142 But the amendment to Title VII was 
 
have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the 
ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress in-
tended to protect; . . . the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Man-
ufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed 
the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA.”). 
 137. See Shinall, supra note 125, at 2 (“Congress failed to define what the 
terms ‘impairment,’ ‘substantially limits,’ ‘major life activities,’ and ‘regarded 
as’ precisely meant. Nor did Congress provide any rules of construction for the 
undefined terms in the ADA. As a result, years of litigation ensued over the 
meaning of these terms and, more broadly, over who was disabled for the pur-
poses of the ADA.”). 
 138. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Al-
bertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471 (1999). 
 139. For well-known empirical work finding a decline in labor market out-
comes after the passage of the 1990 version of the ADA, see Acemoglu & 
Angrist, supra note 15; DeLeire, supra note 56. 
 140. See, e.g., Best et al., supra note 37, at 995 (suggesting that Title VII is 
not as beneficial to non-white women as it is to white women, but not arguing 
that non-white women are worse off under Title VII than they were in the ab-
sence of the statute). 
 141. 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964). 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(a)(1) (2012). 
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rejected, creating a colorable argument that Congress, in its act 
of rejecting the amendment, intended Title VII to encompass 
multidimensional discrimination claims. Furthermore, the 
qualifier “solely” does not appear (nor has it ever appeared) in 
any subsequent employment discrimination statute like the 
ADA143 or ADEA.144 This observation, by extension, raises an 
argument that multidimensional claims may be cognizable un-
der all employment discrimination statutes, not just Title VII. 
Third, an amendment that adds the phrase, “or any combi-
nation thereof,” to current federal discrimination statutes may 
actually be harmful for victims of across-statute interdiscipli-
nary discrimination. If the phrase were added to Title VII, for 
instance, it would strongly nudge courts in the direction of con-
sidering multidimensional discrimination claims, as long as 
those claims were on the dimension of Title VII. For instance, 
such language would strongly endorse the cognoscibility of 
race-sex claims, religion-national origin claims, and race-color 
claims.145 But such language would also arguably exclude the 
possibility of multidimensional discrimination claims that go 
beyond the scope of Title VII—including the type of multidi-
mensional discrimination claim at issue here, sex-disability 
claims. For all these reasons, amending federal employment 
discrimination statutes is neither a realistic nor a satisfying so-
lution to the problems faced by workers who are both disabled 
and a gender minority within their industry. Instead, the more 
practical solution is to work within the confines of current in-
terpretations of Title VII and the ADA to address intersectional 
sex-disability discrimination, which is the subject of the next 
Section. 
B. WORKING WITH CURRENT STATUTES 
Perhaps the most obvious way for intersectional sex-
disability plaintiffs to proceed is through the existing sex-plus 
framework under Title VII. The sex-plus theory of liability un-
der Title VII alleges that the employer treats a certain charac-
teristic better in one sex than the employer treats the same 
characteristic in the opposite sex. Recognition of this theory of 
 
 143. See id. §§ 12101–12213. 
 144. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
 145. See Areheart, supra note 39, at 234 (“This solution would expressly 
allow cases that allege discrimination based upon more than one category to 
proceed without forcing the plaintiff to choose among the distinct categories 
explicit in the statute.”). 
  
1150 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1099 
 
Title VII liability traces its origins to the 1971 Supreme Court 
decision, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.146 In Phillips, the 
employer-defendant, Martin Marietta, had a policy against hir-
ing women with preschool-aged children, but not men with pre-
school-aged children. The plaintiff, Ida Phillips, had preschool-
aged children and had applied, but had been rejected, for a po-
sition in which approximately three-quarters of all applicants 
hired were women.147 Thus, Phillips would have had a difficult 
time bringing a traditional disparate treatment or disparate 
impact case under Title VII, since Martin Marietta was obvi-
ously willing to hire women (just not women with preschool-
aged children). Phillips, as a result, brought the case under the 
theory that by treating women with preschool-aged children 
differently than men with preschool-aged children, Martin 
Marietta was discriminating on the basis of sex.148 The Su-
preme Court agreed and endorsed the sex-plus theory of liabil-
ity, at least with respect to the right to have children.149 
Extending the logic of Phillips, a sex-plus-disability case 
would take the same sex-plus theory and allege that an em-
ployer who treats disabled workers of one sex less favorably 
than disabled workers of the other sex violates Title VII. In-
deed, broadening the theory from sex-plus-reproduction to sex-
plus-disability is relatively straightforward under the line of 
cases extending from Phillips. Courts have taken Phillips to 
stand for the proposition that employers who treat one sex dif-
ferently than the other sex on the basis of any fundamental 
right, not just reproduction, violate Title VII.150 Moreover, 
courts have extended the theory to include discrimination be-
tween the sexes on the basis of any immutable characteristic.151 
Disability, of course, may be mutable for some individuals af-
 
 146. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
 147. See id. at 543. 
 148. See id. at 544. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 
1975) (“Equal employment opportunity may be secured only when employers 
are barred from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable 
characteristics, such as race and national origin. Similarly, an employer can-
not have one hiring policy for men and another for women if the distinction is 
based on some fundamental right.”). 
 151. See id.; Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (hold-
ing that sex-plus liability under Title VII “allows plaintiffs to bring a Title VII 
claim for sex discrimination if they can demonstrate that the defendant dis-
criminated against a subclass of women (or men) based on either (1) an immu-
table characteristic or (2) the exercise of a fundamental right”). 
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fected by nonpermanent conditions (e.g., pregnancy-related 
disability),152 but for the most part, courts have traditionally 
considered disability an immutable characteristic.153 Conse-
quently, the sex-plus-disability theory of liability should pro-
vide an available remedy for individuals who endure intersec-
tional sex-disability discrimination in the workplace. 
Yet a brief search for prior sex-plus-disability cases 
brought in federal court turns up only a handful of cases,154 in 
spite of the fact that the EEOC charge data presented in Part 
II indicates that sex-disability intersectional discrimination is 
not an uncommon occurrence. This observation raises questions 
about why sex-plus-disability is a theory of liability virtually 
unheard of in federal court. Several forces may be at work to 
limit the number of sex-plus-disability claims on the federal 
court dockets. On one hand, the sex-plus-disability theory may 
be too conceptually limited to cover all sex-disability intersec-
tional claims. As one scholar has commented, the sex-plus theo-
ry “does not involve discrimination based on something in addi-
 
 152. Note, however, that a great deal of early ADA litigation centered on 
the issue of whether a nonpermanent condition could ever be a disability for 
the purposes of the ADA, but the 2008 ADA Amendments largely resolved this 
debate in the affirmative. See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 
333 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Under the ADAAA and its implementing regulations, an 
impairment is not categorically excluded from being a disability simply be-
cause it is temporary.”). 
 153. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 41 (recognizing that even though courts 
have traditionally considered disability an immutable characteristic, “[m]any 
forms of disability, too, might fall through the cracks of the revised immutabil-
ity, as conditions subject to control and yet seldom celebrated as features of 
identity”); see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Norris, J., concurring) (“It is clear that by ‘immutability’ the [Supreme] Court 
has never meant strict immutability in the sense that members of the class 
must be physically unable to change or mask the trait defining their class. 
People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily become 
naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate children can be changed. People 
can frequently hide their national origin by changing their customs, their 
names, or their associations. . . . At a minimum, then, the Supreme Court is 
willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if changing it would involve 
great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a traumatic 
change of identity.”). 
 154. An advanced Westlaw search for federal cases using the terms “sex 
plus” and “disability” brings up only three prior cases in which the sex-plus-
disability theory was advanced by the plaintiff. See Martinez v. NBC, Inc., 49 
F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Cardenas-Meade v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3:09-
CV-268, 2011 WL 6026893, at *9–10 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2011), aff ’d, 510 F. 
App’x 367 (6th Cir. 2013); Preston v. Bristol Hosp., No. 3:12-CV-1252 RNC, 
2015 WL 1456764, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2015). In all three cases, the plain-
tiff was ultimately unsuccessful in proving sex-plus-disability discrimination. 
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tion to sex”; the theory instead prohibits employer practices 
that are, first and foremost, based on sex, but only apply to a 
subset of that sex.”155 Along these lines, it is important to rec-
ognize that a sex-plus-disability claim is, at bottom, a sex dis-
crimination claim. A successful plaintiff under this theory 
would be entitled to a remedy under Title VII, not the ADA.156 
This statutory distinction may be important for disabled indi-
viduals who, at the time of filing a charge, believe that the 
principal basis for discrimination is their disability (and as a 
result, only file an ADA charge). If such individuals realize only 
later during the investigation or discovery processes that sex 
also played a role in their adverse employment action, they are 
nonetheless barred from pursuing a sex-plus theory, as they 
will have failed to exhaust their Title VII administrative reme-
dies.157 
On the other hand, an even more likely explanation for the 
scarcity of sex-plus-disability claims is the difficulty of proof. A 
sex-plus claim, by its very nature, requires a plaintiff to prove 
that an employer treats members of one sex with a certain im-
mutable characteristic or fundamental right differently than 
members of the other sex with that same immutable character-
istic or fundamental right.158 In the case of disability, present-
ing such proof might be exceptionally difficult, as it would re-
 
 155. Shoben, supra note 29, at 804. 
 156. See id. at 802 (“Another argument supporting the view that Title VII 
prohibits intentional discrimination against compound groups relies on the 
principles of ‘sex-plus’ discrimination. Sex-plus discrimination occurs when a 
hiring practice, while not explicitly directed at a particular sex, operates to ex-
clude only one sex.”). A plaintiff who, instead, tried to bring a disability-plus-
sex claim under the ADA (a claim that an employer treats each sex differently 
among disabled workers) would face even more difficulty given that courts 
have not recognized the existence of plus claims under any other discrimina-
tion statute besides Title VII. See, e.g., Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 
875 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff ’d, 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Although I recog-
nized a ‘sex-plus-age’ discrimination claim under Title VII in Arnett, I specifi-
cally stated: ‘It is important to remember that . . . Arnett’s complaint contains 
a claim for sex discrimination, not age discrimination.’ I find no authority to 
recognize an ‘age-plus-disability’ discrimination claim under the ADEA. There-
fore, plaintiff is not entitled to protection as a member of a subclass of older 
workers with disabilities.” (citation omitted)); Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240 (al-
lowing a sex-plus-age discrimination case to proceed under Title VII, but not 
an age-plus-sex case). 
 157. See supra note 16. 
 158. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 131, at 1472 (noting that the sex-
plus-race theory of liability “requires that the court ask only ‘if the employer’s 
rule singled out only women among Black persons. The answer might be yes, 
but then only a sex discrimination claim has been established’”). 
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quire a showing that the employer treats disabled workers of 
one sex differently than disabled members of the other sex. In 
the absence of any smoking-gun statements from the employer, 
proving comparative disadvantage in an employment discrimi-
nation case is most commonly done via a similarly situated 
comparator—in this instance, providing evidence of another 
employee who is similarly situated to the plaintiff in all re-
spects except sex.159 But finding such a comparator would re-
quire sex-plus-disability plaintiffs to identify a fellow employee 
of the opposite sex who has both the same (or highly similar) 
job title and is similarly disabled, but who has been treated 
more favorably by the employer.160 Clearly, finding such a com-
parator would prove quite difficult for most sex-plus-disability 
plaintiffs, as it requires plaintiffs to have both a non-unique job 
title and at least one similarly disabled coworker161 of the oppo-
 
 159. See Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex 
Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1491 (2009) (“The most common method is 
to show that similarly situated employees of a different race or sex received 
more favorable treatment.”). Some federal circuits require similarly situated 
comparator evidence in order to prove an employment discrimination case in 
the absence of direct evidence; others strongly prefer such evidence. For a dis-
cussion of the problems created by federal courts’ insistence on a similarly sit-
uated comparator, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 
120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011). 
 160. See generally Goldberg, supra note 159 (engaging in a discussion 
about the problems created by the judiciary’s dependence on comparators); 
Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831 (2002) (analyzing the 
complications in courts’ analyses of the comparator concept); Charles A. Sulli-
van, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 
ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009) (arguing for a more objective standard of comparabil-
ity). 
 161. Here and henceforth, I refer to a worker finding a coworker to serve as 
a similarly situated comparator for simplicity. Finding such a comparator 
would be appropriate outside the hiring context; in the hiring context, the ap-
propriate comparator would be a fellow applicant. As a practical matter, iden-
tifying potential comparators from an applicant pool is even more challenging 
since individuals typically know very little about whom they are competing 
against for a job, and firms often do not keep good, discoverable records of 
their applicants (or at least, records as good as the ones they keep for their 
employees). The unavailability of firm applicant flow data can prove an in-
surmountable barrier for many plaintiffs trying to prove hiring discrimination. 
For a recent discussion of plaintiff proof barriers in the absence of applicant 
flow data (in the context of criminal background check disparate impact cas-
es), see Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimina-
tion Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. 
L. & POL’Y 2, 7, 16 (2012). 
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site sex.162 Indeed, finding a comparator would almost certainly 
be impossible outside of a large employer.163 
The proof problems that arise from identifying (or, more 
accurately, the inability to identify) a similarly situated com-
parator are not unique to sex-plus-disability plaintiffs, or even 
sex-plus plaintiffs more generally. The problems may be more 
acute for sex-plus plaintiffs, who, due to the underlying nature 
of their claim, have a narrower pool of potential comparators.164 
Still, these problems arise for nearly all Title VII, ADA, and 
ADEA plaintiffs who lack direct, non-circumstantial evidence of 
employer discrimination.165 For this reason, outcries for reform 
of the current proof structures in employment discrimination 
cases abound from scholars166 and even federal judges.167 More-
over, federal courts clearly have the ability to reform current 
employment discrimination proof structures since the relevant 
federal statutes do not contain any language regarding method 
 
 162. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the 
Legal Framework for Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 101, 139 (2016) (“The use of comparators to prove discrimination can be 
problematic, particularly for employees of small companies (since few other 
employees can serve as potential comparators) and employees with unique job 
titles (since arguably no other employee is similarly situated).”). 
 163. See id. 
 164. Cf. Kotkin, supra note 159, at 1491–92 (discussing the difficulty of 
finding a similarly situated comparator in Title VII cases and noting that “[i]n 
the typical ‘reduction in force’ situation, as long as one woman or one minority 
group members survives the RIF, it will be difficult to rely on comparator evi-
dence alone”). 
 165. Goldberg, supra note 159, at 731–32, 738 (noting that “in a mobile, 
knowledge-based economy, actual comparators are hard to come by, even for 
run-of-the-mill discrimination claims” and arguing that courts’ continued pref-
erences for comparator evidence “has put comparators in a position to shape 
and limit what courts can see as discriminatory”). 
 166. See id. at 728 (arguing that comparators must be “dislodged from their 
methodological pedestal” in order to “recover space for the renewed develop-
ment of discrimination jurisprudence and theory”); Lidge, supra note 160, at 
833 (“[C]ourts should not require a similarly situated showing as an element 
of plaintiff ’s prima facie [discrimination] case.”); Sullivan, supra note 160, at 
197 (“[S]uggesting a more commonsensical approach to discrimination 
claims—one that reframes proof in terms of the underlying substantive law 
rather than focusing on special evidentiary rules or proof structures.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(Wood, J., concurring) (“I write separately to call attention to the snarls and 
knots that the current methodologies used in discrimination cases of all kinds 
have inflicted on courts and litigants alike. The original McDonnell Douglas 
decision was designed to clarify and simplify the plaintiff ’s task in presenting 
such a case. Over the years, unfortunately, both of those goals have gone by 
the wayside.”). 
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of proof,168 and the current proof structures are entirely the cre-
ation of the Supreme Court.169 
  CONCLUSION   
In thinking about how to reform employment discrimina-
tion proof structures in a manner friendlier to sex-plus-
disability plaintiffs, and intersectional plaintiffs more generally, 
at least one scholar has contemplated a manner through which 
 
 168. Title VII only dictates burden of proof in disparate impact cases, as a 
result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). Title 
VII says nothing about indirect or direct methods of proof or similarly situated 
comparators in the text of the statute. See id. §§ 2000e-2–2000e-17. Nor does 
the ADA and ADEA contain any text about proof structures or similarly situ-
ated comparators. See id. §§ 12101–12213; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
 169. The indirect method of proof—through which plaintiffs prove employ-
ment discrimination in the absence of increasingly less common “smoking gun” 
statements from the employer—was first outlined by the Supreme Court in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In this landmark 
case, the Court outlined a three-stage burden-shifting process for proving an 
employment discrimination case indirectly: employee proves a prima facie case 
of discrimination, employer produces a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for the alleged adverse employment action, and employee proves that the em-
ployer’s reason is merely pretext. Id. at 802–06. Evidence of a similarly situat-
ed comparator who was treated better than the plaintiff may be relevant at 
both the prima facie case stage and the pretext stages, depending on the fed-
eral circuit court. See Sullivan, supra note 160, at 194 (“[S]ometimes the pres-
ence or absence of a comparator is assessed by the court in determining 
whether plaintiff has made out her prima facie case; in other instances, it 
arises in deciding if the plaintiff can establish pretext.”). None of the three-
part McDonnell Douglas test is grounded in the statutory text of Title VII or 
any other employment discrimination statute. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U.S. at 802–06. Although the Court’s three-stage process was intended “to 
clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action challenging em-
ployment discrimination,” the process has arguably generated more confusion 
than clarity. Id. at 798; accord Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, 
Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. 
REV. 703, 744–60 (1995); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Person-
al Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employ-
ment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1188–90 (2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1241 (1995); Deborah 
C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 2229, 2236–38 (1995); see also Coleman, 667 F.3d at 863 (Wood, J., con-
curring) (“Perhaps McDonnell Douglas was necessary nearly 40 years ago, 
when Title VII litigation was still relatively new in the federal courts. By now, 
however, . . . the various tests that we insist lawyers use have lost their utili-
ty. Courts manage tort litigation every day without the ins and outs of these 
methods of proof, and I see no reason why employment discrimination litiga-
tion . . . could not be handled in the same straightforward way.”). 
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courts might expand the permissible methods of proof to 
demonstrate discrimination indirectly: 
In order to have a fighting chance in a complex claim, it seems obvi-
ous that the evidentiary net must be cast wide. In fact, the more spe-
cific the complex claim, the wider the net must be to prove pre-
text. . . . To determine whether there was complex discrimination at 
work, the pool of possible comparators would have had to be expand-
ed, as would the database from which statistical evidence could have 
been gathered. “Me too” evidence would have had to been sought up 
the chain of supervisory command. There is nothing in discrimination 
law doctrine that necessarily prevents some expansion of the eviden-
tiary pool in this manner.170 
As suggested above, few sex-plus-disability discrimination 
plaintiffs will ever be able to succeed if not allowed to present 
additional circumstantial evidence in the courtroom besides a 
similarly situated comparator. This additional evidence might 
include employer practices with respect to coworkers in non-
similar jobs to the plaintiff, coworkers with non-similar disabil-
ities to the plaintiff, and even non-disabled coworkers. Statis-
tics regarding the overall hiring and promotion practices of the 
employer with regards to members of the minority sex and dis-
abled individuals might also be useful, even if these statistics 
include some jobs that are dissimilar to the plaintiff ’s job. To-
gether, an abundance of this type of evidence, while not enough 
to sustain a case on its own, might be enough to form the “con-
vincing mosaic”171 of circumstantial evidence necessary for the 
plaintiff to win the case. 
What is certain is that victims of sex-plus-disability dis-
crimination will remain largely marginalized and without a 
complete remedy in the absence of employment discrimination 
proof reforms. This Article is not unique in its call for such re-
forms. This Article is unique, however, in its identification of a 
previously ignored yet substantial group of discrimination vic-
tims who remain disenfranchised by the current system of re-
solving employment discrimination claims. For these victims, 
proving an employment discrimination case under current 
proof structures is even more difficult than it is for the groups 
 
 170. Kotkin, supra note 159, at 1497–98. 
 171. This phrase, first coined by Judge Posner in the well-known opinion 
Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994), is now fre-
quently used by federal judges, particularly in the Seventh Circuit, to signify 
the amount of circumstantial evidence necessary to prove an employment dis-
crimination case successfully. See, e.g., Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 
635, 637 (7th Cir. 2013); Coleman, 667 F.3d at 835. 
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of victims highlighted by previous scholars.172 The issues raised 
by intersectionality under the current system of adjudicating 
employment discrimination claims are relevant to more than 
African-American women. As this Article has demonstrated, 
they are relevant to the non-negligible group of disabled work-
ers who are also a gender minority within their industry. Un-
doubtedly, they are also relevant to other groups of workers 
who are members of two or more protected classes and, as a re-
sult, fall victim to intersectional discrimination. Without proof 
reforms, these workers who, in name, are protected by multiple 
employment discrimination provisions, but in fact, cannot ac-
cess these provisions, will continue to be victimized. And with-
out an accessible legal remedy, these workers will remain sub-
stantially impaired in the labor market. 
 
 172. Indeed, as difficult as it would be for an African-American female 
plaintiff to find a similarly situated comparator (who would need to be an Afri-
can-American male with a highly similar job) in order to prove a sex-plus-race 
case circumstantially, the difficulty pales in comparison to the hurdle faced by 
sex-plus-disability plaintiffs (who would need to find a similarly disabled com-
parator of the opposite sex in a highly similar job). Cf. Goldberg, supra note 
159, at 736 (“[A]n employee, such as a black woman or a disabled older man, 
claims to have experienced discrimination based on a combination of legally 
protected traits. He or she struggles under a comparator regime in part be-
cause it can be difficult to decide who is the proper comparator.”). 
